GR L 46485; (November, 1979) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-46485 November 21, 1979
NORMAN LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Norman Lacson was convicted of frustrated homicide by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for shooting Jimmy Pitalio. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that on January 23, 1972, Pitalio, who was drunk and known in the locality for his bad character, forcibly entered Lacson’s residence after kicking open the gate. Pitalio confronted Lacson’s wife, demanding to see their truck driver and threatening that something would happen if his demand was not met. When Lacson intervened and told Pitalio to abide by the law, Pitalio retorted, “Ano ang batas, ito ang batas!” Lacson, retrieving his wife’s .22 caliber pistol from her handbag, then shot Pitalio once in the chest. The lower courts acknowledged unlawful aggression by Pitalio and a lack of sufficient provocation from Lacson. However, they ruled that the means employed by Lacson—using a firearm—was not reasonably necessary, as they did not find credible Lacson’s claim that Pitalio was armed with a knife during the attack. Thus, while incomplete self-defense was appreciated, mitigating his liability, Lacson was not fully acquitted.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Lacson acted in complete self-defense, thereby entitling him to an acquittal.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and acquitted Lacson on the ground of complete self-defense. The Court held that all requisites of self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code were present: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. The Court found that the lower courts erred in their assessment of “reasonable necessity.” It emphasized that this standard does not require strict material equivalence between the attack and the defense. Instead, it involves a rational equivalence judged by the emergency, the imminent danger faced, and the instinct of self-preservation. Given the circumstances—a drunken, aggressive, and characteristically violent intruder forcibly entering Lacson’s home and making threats—the imminent danger to Lacson and his wife was clear. The firearm, being the only weapon immediately available to repel the sudden attack, constituted a reasonably necessary means of defense. The Court ruled that in such emergencies, human nature acts on the instinct of self-preservation, not cold calculation. Therefore, Lacson’s act was justified, warranting his full acquittal.
