G.R. No. L-46010; July 23, 1987
CANDIDA BAGAMASPAD MUNEZ and SEVERINO MUNEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERMAN ECHAVEZ and CRESENCIANA CANOY, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners executed a pacto de retro sale over two parcels of land in favor of respondent German Echavez in 1947. In 1967, petitioners filed a civil case seeking a declaration that the transaction was an equitable mortgage. The trial court, in a 1971 decision, declared it a true sale with right to repurchase and ruled the right had expired, making Echavez the absolute owner. Upon petitioners’ motion, the court reconsidered on August 2, 1971, granting them a 30-day period from finality of judgment to redeem under Article 1606 of the Civil Code. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied on September 28, 1971, and he filed a notice of appeal on October 19, 1971, which he never perfected.
On July 18, 1972, respondents moved for execution, alleging petitioners failed to redeem. The trial court granted this on November 15, 1972, declaring respondents absolute owners. A writ of execution was served on petitioners on December 11, 1972, leading to a levy and sale of their property. On February 24, 1973, petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, claiming excusable negligence as they were misled by respondent’s unperfected appeal and could not ascertain when the 30-day redemption period began.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court’s grant of the petition for relief, having been filed beyond the reglementary period under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the petition for relief was filed out of time. Under Section 3, Rule 38, such a petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or proceeding, but not more than six (6) months from entry thereof. The reckoning point for the 60-day period is the date of knowledge of the adverse order.
Petitioners were served a copy of the writ of execution on December 11, 1972. This service constituted personal notice of the final and executory order of November 15, 1972, against them. Their period to file the petition for relief thus commenced on December 11, 1972. They filed only on February 24, 1973, which was seventy-five (75) days later, or fifteen (15) days beyond the 60-day reglementary period. The trial court, therefore, had no authority to grant the belated petition. The petitioners’ duty was to prove strict compliance with Rule 38’s timelines, which they failed to do. Their contention that the 30-day redemption period under Article 1606 had not begun due to the lack of an entry of judgment is unavailing, as the finality of the judgment and their awareness thereof were established by the service of the writ of execution. No substantial injustice or fraud warranting relaxation of the rules was shown.