GR L 4589; (February, 1953) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4589; February 27, 1953
MARIO DE LA CRUZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS
Mario de la Cruz, alias Lim Kiu Tiong, was born on May 24, 1925, in Manila to Chinese parents who were citizens of the Republic of China. He completed his primary education and reached the second year of high school at San Juan de Letran College, a government-recognized school open to students of any race or nationality. He was a co-owner of “State Lumber” with a capital of P50,000, had an annual income of P5,000, and owned an automobile and a truck. He filed his petition for naturalization on June 16, 1948. During the pendency of the court proceedings, he filed his “declaration of intention” with the Office of the Solicitor General on October 20, 1948, which was after he had already filed his petition. This sequence contravened Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law ( Commonwealth Act No. 473 , as amended), which requires the declaration of intention to be filed one year before the petition. He claimed exemption from this requirement under Section 6 of the same Act, arguing that he was born in the Philippines and received his primary and secondary education in a government-recognized school open to all nationalities.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mario de la Cruz is exempt from the requirement of filing a declaration of intention one year before his petition for naturalization.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila and denied the petition for naturalization. The Court held that the appellee, having completed only up to the second year of high school, did not complete his secondary education and therefore was not entitled to the exemption under Section 6 of the Naturalization Law. The doctrine established in Florentino Uy Boco vs. Republic of the Philippines was reiterated, stating that one who has studied only up to the second year of high school has not received secondary instruction but only a part of it. The Court further ruled that the filing of the declaration of intention during the court proceedings did not constitute substantial compliance with the law, as the terms and conditions for naturalization specified by Congress must be rigidly enforced. The failure of the Solicitor General to object to the introduction of the declaration of intention did not waive the statutory requirement, as the court’s jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by the parties’ acquiescence.