GR L 45536; (April, 1939) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-45536. April 14, 1939.
PEDRO AMANTE, petitioner-appellant, vs. SERAFIN P. HIDALGO, Solicitor-General of the Philippines, respondent-appellee.
FACTS
Petitioner Pedro Amante, as a private citizen, filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He sought to compel the Solicitor-General to institute quo warranto proceedings for the dissolution of “Colegio de San Jose” as a corporation sole and the forfeiture of its corporate franchise. The petition alleged the corporation violated the Corporation Law by failing to file a certified copy of its by-laws with the Bureau of Commerce and Industry despite a request. The Solicitor-General demurred, arguing the petition failed to state a cause of action because the discretion to file such proceedings is vested in him by law and cannot be controlled by mandamus. The trial court sustained the demurrer and, after the petitioner failed to amend, rendered judgment against him.
ISSUE
Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued to compel the Solicitor-General to institute quo warranto proceedings against a corporation.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order. Under Section 199 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the duty of the Solicitor-General (or the Attorney-General) to institute quo warranto proceedings involves the exercise of discretion, as it is conditioned upon his having “good reason to believe” the case can be established by proof. It is a well-settled rule that a writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion vested by law in an officer. While mandamus may compel the exercise of discretion, it cannot dictate how that discretion should be exercised. An exception exists only in cases of manifest, whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary abuse of discretion, which was not present in this case. The Solicitor-General’s refusal to act, based on his judgment, was not an abuse of discretion.
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