G.R. No. L-45390 April 15, 1988
HERMENEGILDO BELEN, GREGORIO ROSARIO, VICTORINO GARCIA, ANTONIO M. BELEN and IGLESIA NI KRISTO, INC., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTIN SAPERA, BASILISA DORIA, JUANITO BUGAYONG, ROBERTO D. BUGAYONG, and HON. FELICIDAD C. VILLALON, as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondents.

FACTS

This case originated from a dispute over ownership of Lot 640 in Dagupan, Pangasinan. The Court of First Instance initially ruled in favor of petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed this, declaring private respondents as owners. The appellate court granted respondents a 30-day option to either indemnify petitioners for improvements on the land (including the Iglesia ni Kristo central office and houses) or sell the 1,494-square-meter portion occupied by these improvements to petitioners. The parties failed to agree on a price, with respondents demanding P200/sq.m. and petitioners offering P10/sq.m. Consequently, the trial court, following the appellate court’s directive, intervened and fixed the fair market value at P55/sq.m. This valuation was based on reports from three court-appointed appraisers (Velasquez: P50; de Vera: P100; Mamaril: P15) and evidence presented.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging the valuation. The Supreme Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, noting it involved a factual determination of land value. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition outright, ruling that appeal—not certiorari—was the proper remedy. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed one day late and was denied, the appellate court holding its order had become final.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari and in denying the belated motion for reconsideration, and whether the trial court erred in fixing the land value at P55/sq.m. instead of applying Presidential Decree No. 76.

RULING

The petition lacks merit. First, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the certiorari petition. Certiorari requires a showing that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court found the trial court’s factual determination on valuation was made with jurisdiction and without such abuse, effectively affirming it. The Supreme Court’s referral did not preclude the Court of Appeals from examining the petition’s sufficiency; it was complying with the referral by evaluating whether certiorari was appropriate. Certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, and petitioners’ failure to timely appeal was fatal. The denial of the late motion for reconsideration, based on finality, was also proper.
Second, the valuation of P55/sq.m. was just and reasonable. Petitioners argued that under P.D. No. 76 , just compensation should be based on the lower of the owner’s declared value or the assessor’s value, purportedly around P17.56/sq.m. However, the Supreme Court, citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, had already declared P.D. No. 76 and related decrees unconstitutional for violating due process by encroaching on the judicial function to determine just compensation. While such decrees may guide valuation, they cannot substitute for the court’s judgment. Here, the trial court properly exercised its judicial function, considering the assessments of three appraisers chosen with party consultation and basing its valuation on the evidence. Thus, the petition is dismissed.