GR L 45364; (August, 1979) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-45364 August 6, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NICOLAS P. SONALAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MIDPANTAO ADIL, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and ANTONIO CALANZA, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Antonio Calanza was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the complex crime of homicide with frustrated homicide for the shooting death of Ponciano Sonalan. The conviction was primarily based on the positive identification by eyewitnesses Elizabeth Soliven and David Sustento, who testified that Calanza was the assailant. The prosecution did not present Ofelia Ticzon, Soliven’s companion during the incident. Calanza appealed to the Court of Appeals. Before filing his brief, he filed a Motion for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence and alleged errors of law. The newly discovered evidence was an affidavit from Ofelia Ticzon, who swore that Calanza was not the gunman and that an unidentified man had threatened her not to testify. The Solicitor General opposed, arguing the affidavit was merely impeaching.
The Court of Appeals granted the Motion for New Trial and remanded the case to the trial court. The prosecution, through the City Fiscal and the private prosecutor (the victim’s brother), filed separate petitions for certiorari with this Court, seeking to annul the appellate court’s resolution and to enjoin the new trial. They argued the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting a new trial based on evidence that was merely impeaching and could have been discovered earlier with due diligence.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in granting a new trial based on the affidavit of Ofelia Ticzon.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions for certiorari. The legal logic is twofold. First, the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The petitioners argued the appellate court’s resolution was interlocutory, but in criminal cases, an order granting a new trial is not considered merely interlocutory because a subsequent acquittal after new trial would bar an appeal by the prosecution on grounds of double jeopardy. Therefore, the proper remedy from the Court of Appeals’ resolution was an appeal, not certiorari. Since the petitioners did not appeal but instead filed these special civil actions, certiorari is inappropriate.
Second, the Court of Appeals did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Granting a new trial rests largely on the sound discretion of the court. The affidavit of Ofelia Ticzon constituted newly discovered evidence that was material and not merely cumulative or impeaching, as it directly asserted that Calanza was not the perpetrator. The appellate court reasonably concluded this evidence could alter the judgment. Furthermore, the ends of justice are better served by allowing the new trial. If the new testimony is unconvincing, the conviction stands and the appeal proceeds. If it leads to acquittal, an innocent man is freed. The Supreme Court found no capricious or whimsical exercise of power by the Court of Appeals that would warrant correction via certiorari. The Restraining Order was lifted.
