GR L 45350; (May, 1939) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-45350; May 29, 1939
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., defendants-appellees.
FACTS
Plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. held a promissory note executed by defendant Esteban Icarañgal, secured by a real estate mortgage. Upon default, plaintiff first filed a personal action for collection, obtained a judgment, and caused a writ of execution to be levied on the mortgaged property. A third-party claim by defendant Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., which had acquired the property at a prior public auction, halted the sale. The judgment remained unsatisfied. Plaintiff then instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE
Whether a mortgage creditor, after electing to sue and obtaining a personal judgment on the promissory note, is barred from subsequently foreclosing the real estate mortgage securing the same debt.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court, en banc, affirmed the dismissal. The Court held that by instituting a personal action for the recovery of the debt and obtaining a judgment, the mortgagee made an election of remedies and thereby waived the right to foreclose the mortgage. This rule, while based on statutory provisions in other jurisdictions, is supported in Philippine law by the principle against splitting a single cause of action. The debt and the mortgage securing it constitute one cause of action. Pursuing one remedy (personal action) to judgment precludes the subsequent pursuit of the alternative remedy (real action for foreclosure). The Court cited its prior ruling in Hijos de I. de la Rama vs. Sajo and aligned the doctrine with procedural principles underlying the Code of Civil Procedure and the Insolvency Law.
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