G.R. No. L-4521 August 18, 1952
STA. MESA SLIPWAYS AND ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and MACARIO TADINA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Sta. Mesa Slipways & Engineering Co., Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in constructing and repairing vessels. Respondents Macario Tadina et al. were its laborers, employed as carpenters under a verbal contract with no fixed period, paid wages weekly. On April 26, 1949, the company posted a notice stating that for inventory purposes, all work would stop on April 30, 1949, and the yard would be closed for two weeks or more, with laborers to be notified when work would resume. The stoppage did not apply to monthly personnel and about 41 laborers and 15 watchmen who continued working. After the two-week inventory, respondents presented themselves to work but were not allowed. They returned at the end of May 1949 and were told they would be called later. They had been paid wages up to their lay-off. Tadina and 36 fellow laborers filed an action with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), alleging the company failed to give the one-month notice under Article 302 of the Code of Commerce and seeking compensation for one month in lieu of notice. The company moved to dismiss, arguing the CIR lacked jurisdiction and that the claim had no legal basis as respondents were paid hourly and only for actual work. During proceedings, ten laborers withdrew due to an amicable settlement, reducing petitioners to 27. The CIR denied the motion to dismiss and, after hearing, ordered the company to pay the equivalent of one month’s wages with interest. The company filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Is Article 302 of the Code of Commerce applicable to this case?
2. Does the Court of Industrial Relations have jurisdiction to decide this case?

RULING

1. Yes, Article 302 of the Code of Commerce is applicable. The Court held that the contract of employment of respondents was without a fixed period, bringing it within the purview of Article 302. The fact that respondents were paid weekly on an hourly basis was for computing wages and time spent, not for determining a fixed term of employment. Citing Sanchez vs. Harry Lyons Construction, Inc., the Court stated that the manner of payment does not represent a special time of employment. The Court also addressed the argument that respondents were not commercial employees, noting that in Philippine Trust Company vs. Smith Navigation Company, repair of vessels was deemed a commercial transaction. Regardless, the CIR, under its general jurisdiction, could grant a month’s pay upon separation without just cause and without notice, as it has discretion in labor disputes to determine wages and conditions.
2. Yes, the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. The Court found all requisites under Commonwealth Act No. 103 were present: (a) an industrial dispute existed; (b) the dispute arose from differences regarding dismissal/lay-off; (c) the number of employees affected initially was 37, exceeding the statutory minimum of 30; and (d) the dispute was causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout. The Court characterized the stoppage of work as a lockout within the contemplation of the law, warranting CIR intervention. Citing Yellow Taxi and Pasay Transportation Worker’s Union vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Company Inc., it held that a laborer deprived of work without just cause during a stoppage has a right to be heard by the CIR. The reduction of petitioners to 27 during proceedings did not divest the CIR of jurisdiction, as established in Pepsicola, Inc. vs. National Labor Union and Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel, which hold that once jurisdiction is acquired, it is retained until final decision.
The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations was affirmed.