GR L 4517; (July, 1951) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4517 to L-4520. July 31, 1951.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GODOFREDO ROMERO, accused-appellee.
FACTS
The accused, Godofredo Romero, was charged in four separate criminal cases for murder, frustrated murder, attempted murder, and illegal possession of firearms. After pleading not guilty, the parties agreed to a joint trial. On May 25, 1950, the prosecution moved for a postponement because essential exhibits were left behind. The court granted the postponement but warned it would be the last, stating that if the fiscal was not ready by the new trial date of June 14, 1950, the court would dismiss the cases. On June 14, the Provincial Fiscal moved for another postponement as two essential witnesses (a ballistic expert and Dr. Dollar) had not arrived. Defense counsel objected, citing the court’s prior warning. The court, noting the fiscal’s repeated lack of preparation, the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and its previous order, granted the defense counsel’s petition and dismissed all four cases. The next day, the fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration, stating the witnesses had arrived hours after the dismissal. The court denied this motion. The fiscal then filed a notice of appeal. The defense moved to dismiss the appeal in the Supreme Court, arguing it would place the accused in double jeopardy since the dismissal was an acquittal on the merits for failure to prosecute and was not with the express consent of the accused.
ISSUE
Whether the appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal would place the accused in double jeopardy.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the accused had not yet been placed in jeopardy. The Court ruled that the dismissal was granted upon the petition of the defendant’s counsel. The act of counsel in moving for dismissal is considered the act of the defendant, constituting express consent to the dismissal. Under Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a dismissal upon the petition or with the express consent of the defendant is without prejudice and not a bar to another prosecution. The Court distinguished this from a situation where the prosecution fails to prove its case after being required to proceed to trial, which results in an acquittal. Here, the dismissal was due to the prosecution’s lack of readiness, granted upon the defendant’s motion, and therefore the defendant waived his right against double jeopardy. The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was deemed equivalent to a motion for new trial, and the appeal was perfected within the allowed period.
