G.R. No. L-45037. November 21, 1991.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GEORGE LITTON, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME, LEONOR SOCHAYSENG and ROGELIO PAZ, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner George Litton, Sr. charged respondents Leonor Sochayseng and Rogelio Paz with adultery. After the prosecution rested its case, both accused filed demurrers to evidence, arguing the prosecution failed to prove the marriage between Litton and Sochayseng beyond reasonable doubt and that Litton had condoned the alleged acts. Nine months after resting its case and before the court could rule on the demurrers, the private prosecutor, newly substituted counsel Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, filed a motion to reopen the trial. The motion sought to introduce certified marriage certificates and an affidavit to conclusively prove the fact of marriage, evidence the former prosecutor had erroneously believed was already sufficiently established through testimonial evidence.
The trial court, through respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome, denied the motion to reopen. The court found no specific rule allowing the prosecution to reopen a case after it had rested and demurrers were filed. It held that allowing such a reopening to rectify a prosecutorial mistake pointed out in a demurrer would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused and could lead to endless delays. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the prosecution’s motion to reopen the case for the presentation of additional evidence after it had rested and after the accused had filed their demurrers to evidence.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that there is no specific provision in the Rules of Court governing motions to reopen a case for the reception of evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment. Judicial action on such a motion is controlled by the paramount interests of justice and rests entirely on the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear abuse is shown.
The Court found no such abuse here. The prosecution, through its original counsel, took a calculated risk in not presenting documentary proof of marriage, relying instead on testimonial evidence. The attempt to reopen came only after the defense, in its demurrer, successfully highlighted this fatal gap in the prosecution’s evidence. Allowing a reopening to remedy this self-imposed predicament after such a significant delay would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It would also set a dangerous precedent, enabling the prosecution to repeatedly upgrade its case by changing counsel and introducing new evidence, thereby perpetuating delay. The trial court’s orders were affirmed, and the lower court was directed to resolve the case with priority.