GR L 4472; (May, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4472; May 8, 1952
ESPIRIDION RONE, CLUADIA AGUZAR, DIONISIA GORDOLAN, GUILLERMO AND AMABLE, both surnamed VENTURA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. VICTOR CLARO and SIMEON BAQUIRING, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
The plaintiffs-appellants claimed ownership of a parcel of land (Lot 4651, Cadastral Survey of Asingan, Pangasinan). They alleged that in 1929, the defendants-appellees, through fraud and deceit, obtained the owner’s duplicate certificate of title from one of the plaintiffs. Further, around 1932 (with a possible erroneous allegation of 1926), the defendants again through fraud procured the plaintiffs’ execution of a deed of sale for the lot in their favor. The plaintiffs discovered this fraud, including the defendants’ possession and enjoyment of the lot, only in March 1941. Due to poverty, they were unable to take immediate action. They filed the complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on February 20, 1950. Instead of answering, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint stated no cause of action and was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case on April 1, 1950, ruling that the action had prescribed.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action had prescribed under the statute of limitations.
RULING
Yes, the trial court’s order of dismissal is affirmed. The nature of the action, as determined from the allegations and prayer in the complaint, is one for relief on the ground of fraud to annul the deed of sale. Under Section 44(3) of Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure), such an action must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. The plaintiffs discovered the fraud in 1941 but filed the action only in 1950, well beyond the four-year prescriptive period. The appellants’ attempt to recharacterize the action as one for recovery of title and possession (governed by a ten-year prescriptive period under Section 40 of Act No. 190 ) to avoid prescription is unavailing. The complaint’s core allegations and prayers center on annulling a fraudulent deed. Even if viewed as a direct action for recovery, it would fail because the defendants could present the still-valid deed of sale, which can only be set aside through a timely action for annulment. Furthermore, the new Civil Code is inapplicable as all relevant transactions and the dismissal occurred before its effectivity.