GR L 4269; (April, 1951) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4269 April 27, 1951
ENRIQUE TAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Enrique Tan filed a petition for certiorari on November 2, 1950, assailing the Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the lower court’s judgment convicting him of qualified theft. In his petition, Tan argued that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion and that the facts found did not constitute qualified theft but at most misappropriation of public funds. He prayed for the judgment to be set aside, a new trial ordered, and a ruling on his legal question. The Supreme Court initially treated the petition as a timely appeal by certiorari and dismissed it, holding the issues raised were factual. Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, clarifying his petition was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 67, not an appeal.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
2. Whether the facts found by the Court of Appeals constitute the offense of qualified theft.
RULING
The Supreme Court, now treating the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 67, dismissed it.
1. On the denial of the motion for a new trial: The Court held that the granting or denial of such a motion lies within the sound discretion of the court. Grave abuse of discretion means capricious or whimsical exercise equivalent to acting without or in excess of jurisdiction. A perusal of the affidavits of Jose S. Catbagan, Catalina Calagnara, and Severino Lucea, presented as newly discovered evidence, showed they were merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching. Their admission would not probably change the judgment. The Court of Appeals did not act capriciously but correctly denied the motion.
2. On the nature of the offense: The Supreme Court did not expressly rule on this issue in the resolution, as it focused on the propriety of the denial of the new trial. However, by dismissing the petition, it implicitly upheld the Court of Appeals’ finding that the facts constituted qualified theft. The Court noted that the defense’s theory of witness instigation had already been presented and rejected by the lower court, which found the prosecution witnesses credible and actuated by truth.
The petition was dismissed.