G.R. No. L-42419 May 27, 1985
PACIENCIA VDA. DE PONGAN, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Paciencia Vda. de Pongan, through her son, filed a claim for death compensation benefits against Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUZTEVECO) following the death of her husband, Dominador Pongan. The deceased had been employed as a stevedore by LUZTEVECO for decades, primarily working night shifts at piers in Manila. He was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) in 1967 and received treatment from the company physician, Dr. Nicolas Bunag, but continued working due to necessity. He died on February 12, 1973. The Acting Referee granted the claim, but the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) en banc reversed, dismissing the case for lack of merit. The Commission found insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between the PTB and his employment, noting conflicting medical evidence on the cause of death.
The dispute centered on the actual cause of death. The death certificate listed PTB, but medical records from Martinez Memorial Hospital from January 1973, a month prior to his death, indicated he was admitted for a cerebrovascular accident (CVA or stroke). An x-ray report from that time noted a lung condition but did not specifically confirm active PTB. LUZTEVECO argued that Pongan died from CVA, an illness not shown to be work-related, and that PTB could not have progressed fatally within one month. Petitioner maintained he suffered from both PTB and CVA, with his long, arduous night-shift work contributing to the aggravation of his conditions.

ISSUE

Whether the death of Dominador Pongan is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

RULING

Yes, the death is compensable. The Supreme Court reversed the WCC decision and reinstated the award. The legal logic proceeds from the presumption of compensability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a social legislation designed for the working man’s relief. This presumption holds unless substantial evidence rebuts it. The Court found the employer failed to present such substantial evidence to overcome the presumption. On the cause of death, the Court applied established doctrine that even if the immediate cause was CVA, compensation is not precluded if the employment contributed to its occurrence. The Court examined the nature of Pongan’s employment as a stevedore, involving constant exposure to the elements and great physical strain over more than thirty years. This strenuous work could reasonably cause or aggravate a cerebrovascular accident by placing repeated stress on the vascular system. The fact of causality between his duties and his illness was thus demonstrated. Consequently, the conclusion of compensability was inevitable. LUZTEVECO was ordered to pay death benefits, burial expenses, attorney’s fees, and an administrative fee.