G.R. No. L-4236 November 18, 1952
ASTERIA BAUTISTA, MAXIMA LOMIBAO, FRANCISCO LOMIBAO, JOSE LOMIBAO, FELISA LOMIBAO and PAULINA LOMIBAO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. EPIFANIO SABINIANO, in his capacity as Guardian ad litem of the minors MARCELINA SABINIANO and CANDIDA SABINIANO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Alberto G. Bautista executed a “Deed of Conditional Donation” on September 7, 1948, in favor of Marcelina Sabiniano, Candida Sabiniano, Atanacio Lomibao, and Alfredo de Guzman. The donees Marcelina and Candida Sabiniano and Alfredo de Guzman were minors at the time, represented by their respective parents, Epifanio Sabiniano and Leonora Cansino, who signed the acceptance in the deed. Atanacio Lomibao was of age and accepted the donation himself. The deed contained conditions, including that the donor retained the right to dispose of the properties and enjoy their products during his lifetime, and that the donees were obligated to pay the donor’s debts and funeral expenses upon his death. After the donor’s death, the plaintiffs, who are the lawful heirs of Alberto G. Bautista, filed an action seeking to declare the donations invalid. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan held the donations to Marcelina Sabiniano, Candida Sabiniano, and Alfredo de Guzman invalid due to lack of valid acceptance by the minor donees, but upheld the donation to Atanacio Lomibao. Epifanio Sabiniano, as guardian ad litem for the minor Sabiniano children, appealed. Leonora Cansino did not appeal, and the plaintiffs did not appeal the validity of the donation to Atanacio Lomibao.

ISSUE

Whether the “Deed of Conditional Donation” executed by Alberto G. Bautista constitutes a valid donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa, particularly with respect to the minor donees.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding the donations to the minor appellants invalid. The Court ruled that the deed, despite its title, was not a valid donation inter vivos. The donor reserved the right to dispose of all the properties donated and to benefit from their products during his lifetime. This reservation meant the conveyance did not take effect upon the execution of the deed. Since the disposition of the properties would only take effect upon the donor’s death and was revocable during his life, the deed constituted a donation mortis causa. As a testamentary disposition, it did not comply with the formalities required for wills under the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 618, as amended). Therefore, there was no lawful transmission of the properties to the donees. The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the validity of the acceptance by the minors’ parents, as the deed itself was invalid. The motion for reconsideration, which cited Articles 639 and 634 of the Civil Code, was denied, as the donor’s reservation was not merely of a right to dispose of some property or a usufruct, but of the full dominion and usufruct over all properties, effectively making the donation revocable and testamentary in nature.