G.R. No. L-42281; April 6, 1990
GODOFREDA B. SUMALINOG, petitioner, vs. CORAZON Q. DORONIO, ISRAEL DORONIO and LORENZO RIVERA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Godofreda Sumalinog filed a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution against respondents Corazon Doronio, Israel Doronio, and Lorenzo Rivera. The complaint alleged that on November 10, 1966, Corazon engaged Sumalinog to wash clothes, which were returned and received without complaint. The following day, Sumalinog went to Cebu City, where Israel confronted her, accusing her of theft based on a charge filed by his mother. Sumalinog denied the accusation. Knowing her innocence, respondents Corazon and Israel, impelled by legal malice, charged her with qualified theft. The complaint further alleged that the supporting affidavit did not establish essential elements of the crime and that Chief of Police Lorenzo Rivera acted without probable cause in filing the complaint. Sumalinog was subsequently acquitted by the Municipal Court on November 29, 1967.
Instead of filing an answer, the private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted the motion, reasoning that Corazon Doronio had probable cause to instigate the criminal case and was not actuated by legal malice, noting that conviction could be based on circumstantial or uncorroborated testimony. The case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals as it involved a pure question of law.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution upon a mere motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court committed reversible error. The legal logic is anchored on the fundamental procedural principle that in a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted. The sole test is the sufficiency of the allegations: whether, assuming the pleaded facts to be true, the court can render a valid judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court must not inquire into the veracity of the allegations at this stage; any doubt must be resolved in favor of requiring an answer and proceeding to trial on the merits.
Applying this test, the complaint sufficiently alleged all the essential elements of an action for malicious prosecution: (1) that a criminal prosecution was instituted by the defendants against the plaintiff; (2) that it terminated in the plaintiff’s acquittal; (3) that the defendants acted without probable cause; and (4) that they were impelled by legal malice. The complaint explicitly averred the filing of the theft case, Sumalinog’s acquittal, the respondents’ knowledge of her innocence, the absence of probable cause, and the presence of malice. These allegations, if proven, would entitle Sumalinog to relief. Therefore, the complaint stated a valid cause of action, and its dismissal was premature. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings.