G.R. No. L-42180 November 10, 1986
CONCESO DIAZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS DE GUZMAN, respondents.

FACTS

The late Teodulo Diaz was the registered owner of land under OCT No. 3139. Upon his death, he was survived by his wife, Maria Espejo, and five children, including petitioner Conceso Diaz. On June 9, 1947, Maria Espejo sold a portion of the land to private respondent Tomas de Guzman via a notarized deed of sale, which was duly annotated on the original certificate of title on October 1, 1947. De Guzman subsequently declared the property for taxation, paid taxes, and had it surveyed. In 1971, he requested the Register of Deeds to issue a transfer certificate of title, but the Register required the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate, which was in the possession of Conceso Diaz as administrator of the estates. Due to Diaz’s refusal to surrender it, de Guzman filed a petition under Section 111 of the Land Registration Act in the Court of First Instance.
Petitioner Diaz opposed the petition, arguing that the sale was void as Maria Espejo had no authority to sell property forming part of an intestate estate, that the purchase price was never received, that the deed was defective for lack of clear land identification, and that the action was barred by prescription and laches. He further contended that the land registration court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition due to these substantial controversies, which should be litigated in an ordinary court.

ISSUE

Whether the land registration court had jurisdiction to order the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title under Section 111 of the Land Registration Act, despite the petitioner’s opposition raising substantive issues regarding the validity of the sale.

RULING

Yes, the land registration court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ resolution, which upheld the lower court’s order for Diaz to surrender the title. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of the proceedings under Section 111 of Act No. 496 and the substantive merits of the opposition. First, the court held that the land, being acquired during marriage, was conjugal property. Upon Teodulo Diaz’s death, one-half belonged to Maria Espejo as her conjugal share, which she could validly sell without judicial authority as the owner thereof. The sale was not void, as she sold her own property, not as an administratrix of the estate. Second, the notarized deed of sale, which acknowledged receipt of the consideration, carries evidentiary weight, and the burden was on Diaz to disprove it with clear evidence, which he failed to do. Third, the deed’s description—including boundaries, dimensions, and area—was sufficient for identification, as corroborated by the survey plan and technical description from the Bureau of Lands. Fourth, the claim of prescription and laches was unavailing because the sale was annotated on the title in 1947, providing constructive notice. The court emphasized that Section 111 proceedings are summary in nature but allow the court to determine if a claim is registrable. Here, de Guzman’s claim was clearly established, and Diaz was given an opportunity to contest it but failed to appear at the hearing, leading to an ex-parte presentation of evidence. Thus, the lower court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to order the surrender of the title for the annotation of the sale and issuance of a new certificate.