G.R. No. L-4205 July 27, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUPERTO METRAN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The appellant, Ruperto Metran, was convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance of Leyte and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, indemnity, and costs. The crime occurred on February 26, 1948, in the barrio of Hiagsam, Jaro, Leyte. Around 1:00 a.m., a group of five armed men, including the appellant, woke the occupants of a house—Valentina Tanala, her sister Potenciana, and her niece Constancia. The intruders, all armed with rifles, ransacked the house. Two men dragged Constancia about twenty meters away, while three men, including the appellant, took Valentina about thirty meters away. After Constancia was released and returned to the house, she and Potenciana heard three shots. Valentina did not return, and her body was found the next morning. The medical examination revealed death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds. The prosecution presented witnesses Potenciana Tanala, Constancia Tanala, and Cornelio Samson, who testified to the appellant’s presence with the armed band led by Juan Susaya on that night. The appellant also signed an affidavit admitting his membership in the gang that kidnapped and killed Valentina, though he claimed not to remember who fired the shots. The appellant’s defense consisted of an alibi, claiming he was in Ormoc, Leyte, at the time, and that his confession was given under fear of punishment from the Philippine Constabulary.

ISSUE

1. Whether the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given.
2. Whether the defense of alibi is credible.
3. Whether conspiracy was sufficiently established to hold the appellant liable for murder despite the lack of evidence identifying the actual shooter.
4. Whether the aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men, advantage of superior strength, nighttime, dwelling, and disrespect to sex are applicable.

RULING

1. The appellant’s claim that his confession was involuntary is an afterthought. He did not specify any torture or pressure, did not complain to the justice of the peace, and details in his affidavit (naming companions with similar-sounding names to known gang members) corroborate its accuracy.
2. The defense of alibi cannot prosper. It is overcome by the positive identification of the appellant by prosecution witnesses, and there is no evidence showing it was impossible for him to be at the crime scene.
3. Conspiracy was sufficiently established. The appellant was a member of an armed band that went together to the victim’s house, and he was one of the three who took the victim away, after which gunshots were heard. All conspirators are liable for the crime.
4. The aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men and advantage of superior strength are not separately considered, as their combination with nighttime constitutes treachery, which qualifies the crime as murder. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disrespect to sex are not applicable because the killing occurred about thirty meters from the house, not within its grounds or integral part, and no specific insult to the victim’s sex was shown aside from the killing itself. The appealed judgment is affirmed.