G.R. No. L-41811 November 10, 1986
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE T. ANG and EUFROCINA C. TOBY, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents, spouses Felipe T. Ang and Eufrocina C. Toby, obtained substantial loans from petitioner GSIS from 1958 to 1971, secured by real estate mortgages on several parcels of land in Manila. Upon their default, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages and purchased the properties at a public auction on March 21, 1974. To gain possession, GSIS filed an ex parte petition for a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 (the law on extrajudicial foreclosure) in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Judge Serafin R. Cuevas granted the petition in an Order dated October 1, 1974, directing the issuance of the writ upon GSIS posting the required bond.
The spouses Ang challenged this order before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The appellate court issued a restraining order and later a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the writ. Ultimately, in a decision dated December 18, 1975, the Court of Appeals annulled Judge Cuevas’s order and made the injunction permanent. This prompted GSIS to elevate the case to the Supreme Court, raising the core issue of its entitlement to a writ of possession.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner GSIS is entitled to a writ of possession for the property it purchased at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the writ of possession. The Court clarified that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 , a purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property as a matter of right, upon the filing of an ex parte motion and the approval of an indemnity bond, during the one-year redemption period. This is a ministerial duty of the court; it exercises no discretion. Any questions regarding the regularity of the sale are to be litigated in a separate subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of the same Act, not as a ground to oppose the issuance of the writ.
The Court cited its precedent in Marcelo Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, which reiterated the ruling in De Gracia v. San Jose, emphasizing that the writ issues as a matter of course. Furthermore, in this case, the redemption period had already lapsed with no redemption made by the respondents, and titles to the properties were already registered in the name of GSIS. The Court, citing JFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera, held that if the court has the power to issue the writ during the redemption period, there is stronger reason to issue it after the expiration of that period, especially when a new title has been issued to the purchaser. Therefore, no justifiable ground existed to deny the writ of possession to GSIS.