GR L 41607; (August, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-41607 August 21, 1990
MARIANO T. NASSER, MANUEL S. NASSER, ROSARIO S. MATUTE, and FORTUNATA ZAMBRANO VDA. DE MATUTE, petitioners, vs. HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila, Br. IV, PATERNO R. CANLAS, and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO ORIENTAL, respondents.
FACTS
In the settlement of the estate of Amadeo Matute Molave, the heirs and interested parties executed a Supplemental Compromise Agreement and Project of Partition, approved by the probate court. The agreement stipulated the payment of attorney’s fees to respondent Atty. Paterno Canlas in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00, payable in property (Hacienda Cadiatan) and cash. A provision established a charging lien on all estate properties to secure this payment, with a clause stating, “upon full payment of the corresponding liability of a party the lien on his/her share is extinguished.” The court’s order approving the agreement also directed the annotation of this obligation on new titles. Subsequently, Atty. Canlas moved for execution, which was granted by respondent Judge Serafin R. Cuevas, ordering the heirs to pay their respective shares.
ISSUE
Whether the provision “upon full payment of the corresponding liability of a party the lien on his/her share is extinguished” implies an agreement for payment by installments, thereby rendering the order of execution improper.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the validity of the order of execution. The Court held that the cited proviso cannot be construed as granting the obligors an option to pay in installments or as binding the obligee to accept partial payments. The legal logic is clear: the paragraph’s sole purpose was to establish a charging lien on the estate properties to secure the payment of attorney’s fees. The proviso merely contemplates the practical scenario where different heirs might pay their respective shares at different times, extinguishing the lien on each share only upon that heir’s full payment. It does not, by implication, alter the nature of the underlying monetary obligation or create a right to pay by installments.
The Court emphasized the legal principle under Article 1248 of the Civil Code that a creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. No such express stipulation existed in the written compromise agreement, which was signed by the heirs with the assistance of counsel and approved by the court after eight months without any objection regarding payment terms. The Court also found no credible proof to substantiate the alleged oral agreement for installment payments made before a Justice. The petitioners’ interpretation was deemed a semantic sophistry designed to delay a valid obligation, which had remained unpaid for sixteen years. The Court lifted the restraining order and declared the order and writ of execution validly issued.