GR L 4141; (August, 1908) (Digest)
AGUSTINA FAELNAR, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JACINTA ESCAÑO, defendant-appellee.
August 15, 1908
FACTS:
Agustina Faelnar, et al. (plaintiffs-appellees) filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte against Jacinta Escaño (defendant-appellee) to recover P10,900 and interest based on a promissory note dated May 10, 1901, purportedly signed by Escaño. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Faelnar. Escaño moved for a new trial, which was denied, and subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.
On appeal, Escaño contended, among others: (1) that she never signed the note nor authorized anyone to sign for her, and that the money was paid to her daughter, not her; (2) that the note was a commercial document requiring protest to keep the obligation alive; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying her motion to present a counterclaim, which was unrelated to the note and filed late. The Court also noted that Escaño did not deny the execution of the note under oath in her answer.
ISSUE:
1. Was the promissory note validly executed by Jacinta Escaño, making her liable for the debt?
2. Was the promissory note a commercial document requiring protest under the Code of Commerce?
3. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant’s late motion to present an unrelated counterclaim?
RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the judgment of the court below.
1. Jacinta Escaño is liable on the promissory note. The Court found the evidence overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiffs regarding the note’s execution. Furthermore, Escaño’s failure to deny the execution of the instrument under oath, as required by Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, effectively admitted its authenticity. The defense that the money was paid to her daughter was rebutted by the daughter’s testimony that she immediately delivered the money to Escaño.
2. The promissory note is not a commercial document. The note’s statement, “Value received from said gentlemen in cash to my entire satisfaction and as a loan to meet my requirements,” indicates it was a simple loan for personal needs. The parties were not merchants, and there was no evidence that the money was actually used in commercial operations. Therefore, the provisions of the Code of Commerce (Arts. 311 and 532) regarding protest for commercial documents did not apply, and protest was not necessary to keep the obligation alive.
3. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to present a counterclaim. The motion was filed too late, during the presentation of the defendant’s proofs, and the proposed counterclaim had no connection with the promissory note being sued upon.