G.R. No. L-4070 February 26, 1952
SEE CHUAN, plaintiff and appellant, vs. the HON. MANUEL DE LA FUENTE and another, defendants and appellees.

FACTS

On February 18, 1949, the plaintiff, See Chuan, filed a petition for injunction against the Mayor and the Treasurer of the City of Manila. He alleged that since October 1948, he had occupied stalls Nos. 2007-2008 in the Divisoria public market. During an inspection by the Chief of Investigation of the Mayor’s Office, aided by members of the Manila Police Department, a Chinese man was found in said stalls who claimed to be an employee of the plaintiff but was not authorized to act as such, and for this reason was apprehended. On January 6, 1949, the Mayor ordered that stalls Nos. 2007-2008 be declared vacant and awarded through public auction according to the procedure established in the Market Code. On January 15, the City Treasurer issued Order M.A. No. 74 declaring the aforementioned stalls vacant. The plaintiff contended that Ordinance No. 3051 and Republic Act No. 37 , which grant preference to Filipino citizens to occupy public market stalls, do not deprive foreigners of occupying them if there are no Filipino applicants. He argued that Order No. 74 was contrary to the provisions of Republic Act No. 37 and Ordinance No. 3051. The defendants threatened to eject the plaintiff from his stalls, so he sought an injunction against them. On February 24, the plaintiff, through an ex parte motion, obtained a preliminary writ of injunction. The next day, the defendants filed their answer, alleging that Order No. 74 was in accordance with Article 48 of the Market Code, and that any violation of any provision of said Code by the stall occupant or his employee is sufficient ground for the revocation of the license and for ejectment from the stall. On June 29, 1950, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution. On June 30, the court, in accordance with said motion, dismissed the petition. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he immediately filed his notice of appeal.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court erred in resolving the defendants’ motion to dismiss without prior notice to the plaintiff.
2. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the case for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal.
1. The alleged error of the court in resolving the motion to dismiss without prior notice to the plaintiff was not prejudicial or important. Even without such a motion, the court could motu proprio dismiss the complaint. Section 3, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides that “when the plaintiff fails… to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time…, the action may be dismissed… on the court’s own initiative.”
2. In this case, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary writ of injunction on February 24, 1949. The defendants filed their answer the next day. The case was available for hearing from February 26, 1949, but the plaintiff let one year, four months, and four days pass without moving for a hearing. This was not an ordinary action but a special urgent remedy. The Court held that this elapsed time constituted an unreasonable length of failure to prosecute, justifying the court in dismissing the complaint motu proprio, especially considering that the plaintiff had obtained a preliminary injunction ex parte. It suited the plaintiff’s interest not to have the case heard for as long as possible so he could continue occupying the stalls.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the plaintiff had no right to occupy the stalls, as this matter had already been definitively resolved in previous cases (Co Chiong, et al. vs. Hon. Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., et al.; The Aranque Market Extension Chinese Vendors Association vs. Hon. Manuel de la Fuente, etc., et al.; and Tan Seng Hoo vs. Fuente, etc., et al.). It is definitively settled that foreigners have no right to occupy stalls in public markets because these are exclusively reserved for Filipino citizens. Given the unfounded nature of the plaintiff’s action, it would be a waste of time to revoke the order of dismissal and order a new hearing.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Justice Tuazon, dissenting (with Justice Reyes concurring):
Neither law nor the Rules of Court provide that the plaintiff shall move for the trial of his case, and much less do they say that the court may dismiss an action when the plaintiff neglects to make such motion. The practice is for the courts to set cases according to their convenience. In courts with clogged dockets, parties should not be blamed and punished for not doing what the plaintiff here is said to have neglected. Section 3 of Rule 30 should be construed to mean unjustified failure to be present when the case is called for trial, or to take steps ordered by the court. If the Court’s interpretation is correct, attorneys should first be warned of this duty. The opinion that the action was unmeritorious and the delay suited the plaintiff’s interest has no place in the decision. If true, this should have placed a greater responsibility on the defendant to see that the case was promptly disposed of.