G.R. No. L-4070 February 26, 1952
SEE CHUAN, plaintiff and appellant, vs. the HON. MANUEL DE LA FUENTE and another, defendants and appellees.

FACTS

On February 18, 1949, the plaintiff-appellant See Chuan filed a petition for injunction (interdicto) against the Mayor and the Treasurer of the City of Manila. He alleged that since October 1948, he had occupied stalls Nos. 2007-2008 in the Divisoria Public Market. During an inspection by the Chief of Investigation of the Mayor’s Office, aided by members of the Manila Police Department, a Chinese man was found in said stalls who claimed to be an employee of the plaintiff but was not authorized to act as such, and was therefore apprehended. On January 6, 1949, the Mayor ordered that stalls Nos. 2007-2008 be declared vacant and awarded through public auction according to the procedure in the Market Code. On January 15, the City Treasurer issued Order M.A. No. 74 declaring the enumerated stalls vacant. The plaintiff contended that Ordinance No. 3051 and Republic Act No. 37 , which grant preference to Filipino citizens to occupy public market stalls, do not deprive aliens of occupying them if there are no Filipino applicants. He argued that Order No. 74 was contrary to the provisions of Republic Act No. 37 and Ordinance No. 3051. The defendants threatened to eject the plaintiff from his stalls, prompting him to seek an injunction. On February 24, the plaintiff, through an ex parte motion, obtained a preliminary prohibitory injunction. The next day, the defendants filed their answer, alleging that Order No. 74 was in accordance with Article 48 of the Market Code, and that any violation of any provision of said Code by a stall occupant or his employee is sufficient ground for the revocation of the license and for ejectment. On June 29, 1950, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of prosecution. On June 30, the Court of First Instance of Manila, in accordance with said motion, dismissed the petition. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for injunction for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The appellant argued that the trial court erred in resolving the motion to dismiss without prior notice to him. The Court held this error was not prejudicial or important, as the court could motu proprio dismiss the action. Section 3, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides that when the plaintiff fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, the action may be dismissed upon the court’s own initiative. In this case, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary prohibitory injunction on February 24, 1949. The defendants filed their answer the next day. The case was ready for trial since February 26, 1949, but the plaintiff let one year, four months, and four days pass without moving for its hearing. The action was not an ordinary suit but a special urgent remedy. The Court deemed this period an unreasonable length of failure to prosecute, justifying the court’s motu proprio dismissal, especially considering the plaintiff obtained the preliminary injunction ex parte. It suited the plaintiff’s interest not to have the case heard for as long as possible so he could continue occupying the stalls. Furthermore, the Court noted that the plaintiff had no right to occupy the stalls, as it had been definitively settled in previous cases (Co Chiong, et al. vs. Hon. Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., et al.; The Aranque Market Extension Chinese Vendors Association vs. Hon. Manuel de la Fuente, etc., et al.; and Tan Seng Hoo vs. Fuente, etc., et al.) that aliens have no right to occupy stalls in public markets as these are exclusively reserved for Filipino citizens. Given the unfounded nature of the action, it would be a waste of time to revoke the dismissal order and set the case for a new hearing. The order was affirmed with costs against the appellant.
Separate Opinions:
Justice TUAZON, dissenting (with whom Justice REYES concurs): Neither law nor the Rules of Court provide that the plaintiff shall move for the trial of his case, nor do they say the court may dismiss an action when the plaintiff neglects to make such a motion. The practice is for courts to set cases according to their convenience. In courts with clogged dockets, parties often face delays despite repeated pleas for calendar inclusion. Section 3 of Rule 30 should be construed to mean unjustified failure to be present when the case is called for trial, or to take steps ordered by the court. If the section means what the majority holds, attorneys should first be corrected and warned. The opinion that the action was unmeritorious and the delay suited the plaintiff’s interest has no place in the decision. If that belief were material, it would have placed a greater responsibility on the defendant to see the case promptly disposed of.