G.R. No. L-40336 October 24, 1975
Lamberto V. Torrijos, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, respondent.

FACTS

Wakat Diamnuan and his wife, co-owners of a parcel of land, sold their one-fourth share to petitioner Lamberto Torrijos in 1968. The deed of sale could not be registered due to the absence of the other co-owners’ copies of the title. Subsequently, in 1969, the entire property, including the share already sold to Torrijos, was sold to Victor de Guia. Torrijos then prosecuted Diamnuan for estafa. The trial court convicted Diamnuan, sentencing him to imprisonment and ordering him to indemnify Torrijos. The court later amended its decision, increasing the indemnity to P25,000.
Diamnuan appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Diamnuan died. His counsel moved to dismiss the appeal, citing Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the death of the convict extinguishes criminal and pecuniary penalties if it occurs before final judgment. Torrijos opposed, arguing the civil liability for indemnity should survive. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, prompting Torrijos to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his civil liability to indemnify the offended party arising from the crime of estafa.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the civil liability survives the death of the accused. The Court set aside the order of the Court of Appeals and directed that the appeal proceed solely on the issue of civil liability.
The legal logic is that the extinction of civil liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code applies only when the civil liability arises exclusively from the criminal act and has no independent basis. In this case, the civil liability did not spring solely from the crime of estafa. The estafa occurred only upon the second sale to de Guia. The primary obligation of the accused originated from the contract of sale with Torrijos. His failure to deliver the property constituted a breach of contract, creating a civil obligation independent of the subsequent criminal act. Therefore, the civil liability, being rooted in contract, is not extinguished by death, as death is not a mode of extinguishing civil obligations under the Civil Code.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that civil liability can be based on tort under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code, which govern human relations and establish liability for acts done with injustice, bad faith, or in a manner contrary to morals. The accused’s act of selling the same property twice was a willful cause of injury, creating an independent civil obligation. Consequently, the appeal should continue for the purpose of determining this surviving civil liability, with the offended party being included as a party and the heirs of the deceased accused substituted.