G.R. No. L-40314 August 17, 1988
LILIAN UYTENGSU LIU and SUSAN UYTENGSU LIMTONG, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. BORROMEO as Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Cebu, GEORGE K. YOUNG, as Executor of the Estate of the late TIRSO UYTENGSU and WILFRED UYTENGSU, respondents.

FACTS

In the testate proceedings for the estate of Tirso Uytengsu, Sr., petitioner Lilian Uytengsu filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator. The purpose was to recover 4,280 General Corporation shares of stock allegedly belonging to the estate but fraudulently transferred through a forged signature of the deceased. Petitioners contended that the incumbent executor, respondent George K. Young, was involved in this fraudulent transfer orchestrated by respondent Wilfred Uytengsu. The respondent judge denied the motion, ruling that appointing a special administrator to litigate the ownership of the shares was improper, especially since the forgery charge was already referred to the city fiscal for investigation.
Petitioners appealed the denial order. The lower court, however, disapproved the record on appeal, deeming the order interlocutory and thus not appealable. After a motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus or certiorari with the Court of Appeals. They sought to compel the approval of their appeal or to have the executor ordered to recover the shares or be relieved. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, citing the interlocutory nature of the order and the existence of an incumbent executor. Petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that the order denying the appointment of a special administrator was interlocutory and hence not appealable.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion. The order denying the appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order does not terminate the proceedings but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided. Citing the established precedent in Garcia v. Flores, the Court reiterated that an order appointing or denying the appointment of a special administrator is merely incidental to the judicial proceedings. The trial court retains control over such an appointment and may modify or revoke it at any time before final judgment. Consequently, such an order is not appealable.
The legal logic is clear: allowing appeals from every interlocutory order would lead to multiplicity of appeals and delay the final disposition of the case. The proper remedy from an interlocutory order is not an appeal but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which requires a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petitioners failed to demonstrate such abuse. The Court noted that the executor remained in his position for years without the fraud charges being substantiated, implying the charges were unfounded. Therefore, the dismissal of the appeal by both lower courts was correct. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.