GR L 40111; (October, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-40111 October 27, 1983
PEDRO S. RAVELO and CARMEN TAN RAVELO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF SALINAS, INC., respondents.
FACTS
The Rural Bank of Salinas filed a foreclosure action against spouses Pedro and Carmen Ravelo over two mortgaged lots securing a P16,000 loan. The Ravelos pleaded the suit was premature due to ongoing negotiations to sell the property for payment. The trial court set an “initial hearing” for September 19, 1969. The Ravelos, through counsel, filed a motion for postponement on grounds of illness, which the court denied. They failed to appear, and the bank was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The court rendered a judgment ordering payment of the debt, and upon failure, the sale of the mortgaged properties.
The Ravelos filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which was denied. The judgment became final. The sheriff subsequently sold the properties to the bank. The Ravelos opposed the bank’s motion for confirmation of the sale, but the trial court confirmed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed this confirmation order. The Ravelos then appealed to the Supreme Court, not against the confirmation order itself, but by assailing the earlier proceedings leading to the original judgment from which they did not appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed reversible error in the proceedings leading to the foreclosure judgment, particularly in omitting a mandatory pre-trial and proceeding with an ex parte presentation of evidence.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, ruling that the Ravelos’ appeal was without merit. The legal logic is anchored on finality of judgment and waiver. The Ravelos did not appeal from the original foreclosure judgment; it had long become final and executory. Their appeal to the Supreme Court improperly challenged the procedural antecedents of that final judgment through an appeal of the later order confirming the sheriff’s sale. On the substantive procedural claim, the record showed the bank had filed a motion to set the case for pre-trial. The court’s scheduling of an “initial hearing” was intended as that pre-trial. The Ravelos, by moving for postponement and failing to appear, effectively waived their right to pre-trial. Jurisprudence holds that failure to specify “pre-trial” in a notice is not an irregularity, and if a defendant does not appear, the plaintiff may present evidence ex parte. Furthermore, the trial court properly denied the motion for postponement as the Ravelos had no valid defense to the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court found the appeal manifestly frivolous and dilatory.