GR L 40095; (July, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-40095 July 29, 1985
AMPARO F. LIM and RODRIGO C. LIM, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUGENIO LAMBERANG and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents.
FACTS
The dispute involves two parcels of land originally part of a 100-hectare tract occupied by the Manasil family. In 1948, Mauricio Manasil sold these parcels to Catalino Aleman. On February 1, 1957, Aleman mortgaged his rights to the land to petitioner Amparo Lim to secure a loan. Due to Aleman’s default, Lim foreclosed the mortgage on January 19, 1959, and took possession. Separately, a money judgment was rendered against Aleman in 1956. To satisfy this judgment, the Deputy Sheriff levied upon and sold the same two parcels at public auction on February 28, 1959, with respondent Eugenio Lamberang as the highest bidder.
On February 27, 1960, within the one-year redemption period, Lim offered to redeem the property from the execution sale, but Lamberang refused. Subsequently, Lim filed an action to annul the auction sale, arguing the land was public and thus not subject to levy. The trial court ruled in Lim’s favor, but the Court of Appeals reversed, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the execution sale of the disputed property to respondent Lamberang was valid, considering the prior foreclosure of the mortgage in favor of petitioner Lim.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment annulling the auction sale. The legal logic rests on the sequence of events affecting ownership and the right of redemption. The Court found that when the sheriff sold the property at auction on February 28, 1959, the judgment debtor, Aleman, was no longer the owner. Ownership had already passed to Lim upon the foreclosure of the mortgage on January 19, 1959. Consequently, the property was no longer part of Aleman’s estate that could be levied upon to satisfy his personal debt. The execution sale was therefore invalid.
Alternatively, the Court held that Lim, as a redemptioner under Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, had a superior right to redeem the property because her mortgage was subsequent to the judgment against Aleman. She validly exercised this right by offering redemption within the one-year period on February 27, 1960. Lamberang’s refusal to accept the redemption was unjustified. The Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve the ancillary issue of whether the land was already private or still public at the time of sale, as the transactions involved were over “rights” to the property regardless of its classification.