G.R. No. L-40060 March 21, 1975
EMETERIO DUQUE, petitioner, vs. CAPTAIN VINARAO (MPD) and CAPTAIN CASTILLO (METROCOM), respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Emeterio Duque filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging he was forcibly taken from his residence on January 11, 1975, by individuals posing as Captain Vinarao and Captain Castillo. He claimed he was confined at the Manila Police Department and later at Camp Crame without any formal complaint, judicial warrant, or specific charge being filed against him. He asserted his detention was illegal, especially given the operation of the new Constitution and the existing civil courts.
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a return of the writ, denying the allegations. They asserted that Duque and his wife were lawfully arrested by virtue of Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4347 issued by the Secretary of National Defense pursuant to General Order No. 2-A. The arrest was initially related to alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code on vagrancy and prostitution. During the hearing, it was further revealed that the detention was also based on an alleged violation of the Espionage Act ( Commonwealth Act No. 616 ), which fell under the jurisdiction of military tribunals per General Order No. 49.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be granted, considering the arrest was made under a military order during martial law and the petitioner subsequently sought to withdraw his petition.

RULING

The Supreme Court considered the petition withdrawn and terminated the case. The legal logic proceeds from the context of martial law, established under Proclamation No. 1081. The Court acknowledged that arrests and detentions pursuant to orders like ASSOs, issued under the authority of General Orders, were recognized as valid under the prevailing legal framework. The respondents justified the detention by certifying it was related to national security, specifically citing an alleged violation of the Espionage Act, a charge within the jurisdiction of military tribunals as decreed.
Crucially, the Court noted the petitioner’s voluntary filing of a notice of withdrawal for his petition. This withdrawal was made after it became apparent during hearings that the detention was not merely for vagrancy but involved more serious allegations connected to national security. The Court, respecting the petitioner’s own manifestation of desire to withdraw, and finding the respondents’ justification for detention under the martial law regime to be plausible, saw no further need for judicial inquiry. Consequently, the petition was deemed withdrawn, effectively upholding the legality of the detention under the cited military orders without making a definitive ruling on the merits of the habeas corpus claim.