GR L 40007; (October, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-40007 October 23, 1985
LORENZO TAÑADA, ROSARIO M. DELGADO and CONCEPCION DELGADO, substituted heirs of the deceased plaintiff Francisco A. Delgado, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE H. TECSON, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, members of the law firm “Delgado and Tañada,” were retained by Narcisa Mendoza in 1940 to represent her in two civil cases under a contingent fee agreement for one-half of any recovery. The cases were settled via compromise agreement, and the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, per Judge Sotero Rodas, issued an order on April 8, 1941, recognizing the attorneys’ lien for one-half of the properties adjudicated to Mendoza. This lien was annotated on the titles. From 1941 to 1958, Mendoza delivered one-half of the produce from the lands to the law firm, sharing expenses equally. However, she ceased deliveries in 1959, prompting petitioners to file an action for partition and accounting.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the contingent fee from one-half to one-fourth of the properties and deleting the award for attorney’s fees.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s decision. The legal logic rests on the finality and immutability of the April 8, 1941 order by Judge Rodas, which expressly recognized the one-half contingent fee lien. This order had long become final and executory. Mendoza’s subsequent actions—surrendering the titles for annotation of the lien and consistently delivering one-half of the produce for 17 years—constituted voluntary execution and acquiescence to that judgment. Under settled jurisprudence, a party who voluntarily acquiesces in or partially executes a judgment is estopped from appealing it or contesting its reasonableness. Therefore, Mendoza (and her successor, respondent Tecson) was barred from challenging the stipulated fee. The appellate court’s reduction of the fee and deletion of the attorney’s fees award constituted a reversible error, as it improperly reopened a final order. The contingent fee contract, having been judicially recognized and partially executed, was binding and enforceable in its original terms.