GR L 39388; (May, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-39388 May 27, 1985
RAYMUNDO ERFE, petitioner, vs. HON. WILLELMO C. FORTUN, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Branch VIII, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, ANGELES L. LEONOR, FLORENTINA L. BIACAN represented by ENCARNACION A. LAYGO, as their Attorney-in-Fact, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents filed a complaint to recover ownership and possession of three parcels of riceland from petitioner Raymundo Erfe. The complaint alleged that the respondents purchased the lands from their mother, Encarnacion A. Laygo, who had possessed them for over ten years, and that Erfe was unlawfully occupying the property. In his answer, Erfe did not claim ownership but asserted that he had occupied and cultivated the lands for over ten years as a share tenant of the former owner, Encarnacion A. Laygo. He sought recognition of his security of tenure as an agricultural tenant.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the private respondents as the owners and lawful possessors and ordering Erfe to vacate. Erfe filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the case be referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 316. The presiding judge, Judge Domondon, denied the motion, ruling that Erfe was in estoppel and that the case was outside PD 316’s purview. After Judge Fortun assumed the sala, he granted a motion for a writ of execution filed by the private respondents. Erfe’s subsequent motion to set aside the decision and stay execution was denied, prompting this certiorari petition.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the tenancy relationship.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the challenged orders. The respondent court violated the express mandate of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316. This law provides that no court shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any case designed to harass or remove a tenant from agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn unless first certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Such cases must be referred for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties.
The legal logic is clear: the jurisdiction to make an initial determination on the existence of a tenancy relationship lies with the agrarian reform authorities, not the regular courts. This is a matter of agrarian reform policy where expertise is vested in the administrative agency. The fact that a decision had already been rendered does not excuse non-referral. Memorandum Circular No. 29, issued to implement PD 316, explicitly mandates referral even after judgment but before execution when such execution would result in the ejectment of an actual tiller or tenant farmer. The purpose is to ascertain if the defendant has become a beneficiary under the land reform program. Therefore, the trial court’s denial of the motion for referral constituted grave abuse of discretion. The case was ordered referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
