G.R. Nos. L-39386 and L-39620-29. January 29, 1975.
FLORENTINA NUGUID VDA. DE HABERER, petitioner, vs. FEDERICO MARTINEZ, BALDOMERO MANALO, FAUSTINO BAGALAWIS, FEDERICO STA. TERESA, ANGELITO KING, GREGORIO DEL ROSARIO, LEODOVICO TORRES, LEON SORIANO, SANTIAGO TUMANG, LUIS PASTOR, CRISTINO LIBRAMANTE and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer filed eleven consolidated cases for recovery of possession of her titled land in Mandaluyong against the private respondents. The trial court rendered an adverse consolidated decision on May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. Subsequently, the trial court issued an Amendatory Order on June 21, 1971, which modified the original decision by ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s title and the issuance of new titles in favor of respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Amendatory Order. On July 17, 1971, the trial court granted the motion for new trial, vacated the proceedings, and set the case for reception of new evidence. After conducting the new trial, the court issued a second and final Amendatory Order on September 15, 1972, which set aside its June 21, 1971 Amendatory Order and reinstated the original decision of dismissal.
Petitioner received a copy of this final order on October 5, 1972. On October 12, 1972, she filed her notice of appeal and tendered an appeal bond, perfecting her appeal. The trial court approved her record on appeal. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, erroneously computing the reglementary period from the original May 1971 decision or the June 1971 Amendatory Order, thereby concluding the appeal was filed out of time.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the appeal. The legal logic is clear under procedural rules. When a motion for new trial is granted, the original judgment is vacated and the action stands for trial de novo. The period for perfecting an appeal must be reckoned from notice of the judgment or order rendered after the new trial. Here, the trial court’s order of July 17, 1971, granting a new trial, vacated the original decision and the amendatory order. The proceedings started anew. Consequently, the final and appealable order was the second Amendatory Order dated September 15, 1972, issued after the new trial. Petitioner received copy on October 5, 1972. She filed her notice of appeal and appeal bond on October 12 and 13, 1972, respectively, well within the 30-day reglementary period from notice. The Record on Appeal contained all material data showing the timeliness of the appeal, in compliance with the material data rule. The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error by miscomputing the period from the earlier vacated orders instead of from the final order issued after the new trial. The appeal was therefore timely perfected.