GR L 39187; (January, 1982) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-39187 January 30, 1982
ANULINA L. VDA. DE BOGACKI, petitioner, vs. HON. SANCHO Y. INSERTO, Presiding Judge, Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ILOILO, and MA. EMMA LUZ BOGACKI, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Ma. Emma Luz Bogacki, the naked owner of four parcels of land, filed an action for partition against her mother, petitioner Anulina L. Vda. de Bogacki, who held a usufruct over a one-sixth portion of said properties. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the petitioner to limit her usufruct to one-sixth of the properties and to turn over five-sixths of the rentals she had collected. This decision became final. To satisfy the money judgment for the collected rentals, the trial court, upon motion, allowed the levy and execution sale of the petitioner’s usufructuary rights after finding no other tangible assets. The usufruct was sold at public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the court issued a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the levy and sale on execution of the petitioner’s usufructuary rights and in issuing the corresponding writ of possession.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that there was no grave abuse of discretion. The Court held that a usufruct, including that of a surviving spouse, is an alienable property interest that may be levied upon and sold at public execution to satisfy a money judgment. It rejected the petitioner’s arguments for exemption. First, Article 321 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the alienation of certain property for family reasons, was deemed inapplicable as it refers to parental usufruct over their children’s property, not a widow’s usufruct. Second, the claim that the usufruct constituted a homestead exempt under the Rules of Court was unfounded, as the execution was levied against the intangible usufructuary right itself, not against a residential homestead. Third, the usufruct is not akin to a purely personal right like support or pension. The Court cited precedent establishing that a usufructuary right is an interest in real property subject to execution. Regarding the writ of possession, its issuance was proper under Rule 39, as the private respondent, being the judgment creditor and purchaser at the auction, was entitled to possession after the redemption period expired without the petitioner redeeming the property. The usufruct was extinguished by merger when the naked ownership and the usufruct consolidated in the private respondent. The Court, however, noted that any improvements built by the petitioner on the property should not be summarily demolished; the trial court must first conduct a hearing to determine if she is a builder in good faith entitled to rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
