GR L 38868; (December 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38868 December 29, 1975
HARRY STUART SCOTT, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, NLRC Chairman, and WHITE EAGLE OVERSEAS OIL CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Harry Stuart Scott filed a complaint for separation, termination, and overtime pay against private respondent White Eagle Overseas Oil Co., Inc. before the National Labor Relations Commission. The case was assigned to an arbitrator who, after proceedings, rendered a decision on March 28, 1974, awarding a substantial sum to Scott. Private respondent received a copy of this decision on April 3, 1974. On April 5, 1974, within the reglementary period, private respondent filed an “Urgent Petition” with the NLRC Chairman, respondent Amado G. Inciong, seeking to set aside the arbitrator’s decision and requesting a reinvestigation. Subsequently, on June 17, 1974, Chairman Inciong issued an order directing a hearing officer to conduct a new hearing on the merits and to prepare a decision within twenty days. Scott challenged this order via certiorari and prohibition, arguing it constituted grave abuse of discretion as the arbitrator’s decision had already become final and executory.
ISSUE
Whether the NLRC Chairman committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering a new hearing, thereby effectively nullifying the arbitrator’s decision which petitioner claims had attained finality.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The legal logic is clear: for a writ of certiorari to issue, the challenged order must be final and there must be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Firstly, the arbitrator’s decision had not become final because private respondent timely filed its “Urgent Petition” on April 5, 1974, which effectively served as an appeal under Presidential Decree No. 21. This petition suspended the finality of the award. Petitioner’s omission of this fact in his pleading was a critical misrepresentation. Secondly, petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as an appeal from the Chairman’s order could have been taken to the Secretary of Labor and then to the President. The Court found no capricious or whimsical exercise of power by respondent Inciong, as his order was a valid exercise of administrative authority to review a non-final decision. Therefore, no grave abuse of discretion warranting certiorari was present.