G.R. No. L-38837 February 27, 1979
JOSE S. DINEROS in his capacity as Receiver of La Paz Ice Plant and Cold Storage Co., Inc., and RICARDO GUERREA, petitioners, vs. MARCIANO C. ROQUE, MANUEL LEZAMA, JUDGE CARLOS Y. GONZALES, GREGORIO L. LIRA as Provincial Sheriff Ex-Officio of Iloilo, and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Jose S. Dineros and Ricardo Guerrea filed an action to annul a default judgment from the Court of First Instance of Manila before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, presided by respondent Judge Carlos Y. Gonzales. On March 7, 1974, the Iloilo court dismissed their complaint. Petitioners received the decision on March 13, 1974, and filed a motion for reconsideration on April 4, 1974. This motion was denied by the respondent Judge on April 22, 1974. Subsequently, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal on April 24 and May 3, 1974, respectively.
Private respondents opposed the approval of the record on appeal, arguing that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma and thus did not suspend the period to appeal. They contended that since the decision was received on March 13, the reglementary period to appeal expired on April 12, 1974, making the judgment final and executory. On May 21, 1974, respondent Judge issued an order agreeing with this view, dismissing the record on appeal, ordering entry of judgment, and issuing a writ of execution. Petitioners then filed this petition for mandamus to compel the approval of their record on appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was pro forma, thereby failing to interrupt the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that the motion for reconsideration was indeed pro forma. Under the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration must point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or are contrary to law, with express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or legal provisions involved. The petitioners’ motion merely made general allegations that the issues were not passed upon, the decision did not conform to the pleadings and proofs, and it was not in accordance with the theory of the action or the law. It failed to specify any particular finding or conclusion lacking evidentiary support or being contrary to law.
A pro forma motion, intended merely to delay proceedings, does not suspend the reglementary period for appeal. Consequently, the period continued to run from the petitioners’ receipt of the decision on March 13, 1974. They had thirty days, or until April 12, 1974, to perfect their appeal by filing a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal. Their filing of these documents on April 24 and May 3, 1974, was clearly beyond the prescribed period. Therefore, the respondent Judge correctly ruled that the decision had become final and executory and properly dismissed the record on appeal. Petitioners failed to establish a clear right to the writ of mandamus, as there was no ministerial duty on the part of the judge to approve an appeal perfected out of time. The temporary restraining order was dissolved.