G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982
RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY and VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rafael Mercado sent a telegram to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, alleging that respondent Virginia Mercado, a public official, had enriched herself through corrupt practices, citing her properties and spending as exceeding her salary. This communication was made in response to a public appeal by the President for information on undesirable government employees. An information for libel was filed against Rafael. He filed a motion to quash, arguing the telegram was a qualifiedly privileged communication under the doctrine of United States v. Bustos. The lower court denied his motion.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash, alleging malice and bad faith. It presented a pattern of conduct by Rafael, including prior administrative and criminal complaints he had filed against Virginia, all of which were subsequently dismissed for lack of evidence. This history was cited to demonstrate that the telegram was not made in good faith but was part of a sustained campaign to harass the respondent.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the libel information based on the claim of qualified privilege.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the denial of the motion to quash. The Court recognized that the communication, being a complaint to a superior official about a subordinate, was prima facie qualifiedly privileged, as established in United States v. Bustos. This privilege generally protects such communications from libel suits to encourage free disclosure of official misconduct.
However, the Court clarified that a qualified privilege is not absolute; it can be defeated by a showing of actual malice or bad faith. The prosecution specifically alleged in its comment that the petitioner acted with malice, detailing a series of previously dismissed complaints filed by him against the private respondent. This factual allegation of a vindictive pattern created a legitimate issue as to the petitioner’s bona fides. Following People v. Monton, the Court ruled that when the information alleges malice, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove it during trial. A motion to quash is not the proper stage to resolve this factual question. The lower court therefore correctly denied the motion to allow the prosecution to present evidence on the existence of malice, which would vitiate the privilege. The petition for certiorari was without merit.