GR L 38570; (May, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38570. May 24, 1988.
Domingo Padua, petitioner, vs. Vicente Ericta, etc., Rundio Abjaeto, and Antonio G. Ramos, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Domingo Padua filed a damage suit in forma pauperis before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, arising from injuries sustained by his daughter who was hit by a truck owned by respondent Antonio Ramos and driven by respondent Rundio Abjaeto. After Padua commenced his direct examination on December 6, 1973, the respondents’ counsel twice successfully moved for postponements, leading to the rescheduling of trial to March 6, 7, and 13, 1974. Subsequently, Padua’s counsel filed a motion dated March 1, 1974, seeking to cancel only the March 6 hearing. The motion stated counsel had a conflicting hearing in a 1966 case in Tarlac, which that court was anxious to terminate, and emphasized that two subsequent hearing dates would remain. The motion was personally served on opposing counsel, who filed no opposition. On March 6, Padua’s wife appeared in court to verbally reiterate the request.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure of the plaintiff and his counsel to appear at the March 6, 1974 hearing, despite a pending motion for postponement.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the dismissal orders. The Court emphasized that while trial courts possess discretion in granting or denying postponements and dismissing actions, such discretion must be exercised soundly, reasonably, and wisely to serve the ends of justice. Dismissals should not be resorted to when they result in the precipitate loss of a party’s right to present evidence, especially where the suit appears meritorious and no intent to delay is manifest.
The trial court’s dismissal was a grave abuse of discretion under the attendant circumstances. Padua’s counsel filed his first postponement motion five days in advance, citing a legitimate conflict with a long-pending case in another court. The motion sought to cancel only one of three set dates, preserving two immediate future dates for trial, and caused no substantial prejudice to respondents, who had themselves twice obtained postponements without objection. The court’s summary dismissal, after ignoring these mitigating facts and the absence of any showing of culpable negligence or deliberate delay by Padua, was unwarranted, capricious, and oppressive. The case was reinstated for trial on the merits.