G.R. No. L-38255 June 18, 1974
BERNARDO MARGATE, GORGONIO MALBAS, DANIEL MARGATE, and NENITO OCAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VIRGINIA TUPAZ and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, daily wage earners, filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the annulment of an award, deed of sale, and certificate of title over a lot in the Fabie estate in favor of respondent Virginia Tupaz. They alleged Tupaz was not a resident-occupant of the lot, contrary to the conditions of the government sale. After losing in the trial court, they appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted their first motion for a 30-day extension, until December 28, 1973, to file their record on appeal, with a warning that it must be printed or mimeographed, not typewritten.
Due to financial constraints and the Christmas season, petitioners filed a second motion for a 15-day extension. However, they committed a clerical error, praying for an extension “from November 28, 1973” instead of from the correct deadline of December 28, 1973. The Court of Appeals denied this motion and dismissed the appeal on January 7, 1974, despite petitioners having actually filed their mimeographed record on appeal on January 11, 1974—a date still within the 15-day period they intended to request. Their motions for reconsideration, which explained the inadvertent error and their indigent status, were likewise denied.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion for a second extension and dismissing their appeal based on a clerical error in the motion, especially considering their indigency and timely actual filing of the record on appeal?

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court annulled the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, finding a grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that while motions for extension are discretionary, such discretion must be exercised judiciously to serve the ends of justice and fairness, particularly when no substantial rights are prejudiced and no intent to delay is manifest. Here, the petitioners’ error was a mere inadvertence in drafting their motion. Their genuine intent to prosecute the appeal was demonstrated by their actual filing of the record on appeal on January 11, 1974, which was within the 15-day period they meant to request from December 28. Their status as indigent wage earners, struggling to comply with procedural requirements, warranted judicial sympathy. The appellate court’s dismissal was based on a rigid and technical reading of the flawed motion, ignoring the substantive compliance and the lack of prejudice to the respondent. The Supreme Court directed the reinstatement of the appeal and the admission of the record on appeal.