G.R. No. L-3824 May 16, 1951
BENJAMIN, RAUL AND MIGUEL, all surnamed TECSON, petitioners, vs. HON. MARIANO C. MELENDRES, etc., and TOMASA BULOS VDA. DE TECSON, as administratrix of the testate estate of the late PABLO TECSON OCAMPO, respondents.

FACTS

The respondent Tomasa Bulos Vda. de Tecson, as administratrix, filed a forcible entry case against the petitioners. The justice of the peace court dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, a judgment by default was rendered against the petitioners on October 8, 1941. The petitioners moved to set aside the default judgment on grounds of accident, mistake, or excusable neglect. The respondent moved for execution. The court did not act on these motions until April 13, 1950, when it denied the motion to set aside the default judgment and granted the motion for execution. The petitioners announced their intention to appeal from the order denying their motion to set aside the default judgment. They inquired about filing a supersedeas bond to stay execution and asked the court not to issue a writ of execution. The respondent court denied these prayers, stating no appeal could be taken from a default judgment and no supersedeas bond was needed. Upon motion for reconsideration, the court fixed a supersedeas bond of P1,000 for the appeal from the April 13 order but held this bond did not stay execution of the default judgment, which it ordered. The petitioners perfected their appeal by filing the required bond and record on appeal and also filed the P1,000 supersedeas bond. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which issued a preliminary injunction. The respondents moved to discharge the injunction, claiming the respondent was already in possession via a writ of execution and that the petitioners’ notice of appeal was only from the part of the order denying the motion to set aside, not from the part granting execution.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by ordering the execution of the default judgment despite the petitioners having perfected an appeal from the order denying their motion to set it aside and having filed a supersedeas bond.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari. It ruled that while there is generally no appeal from a default judgment itself, a party may appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside such a judgment under Rule 38. Upon such an appeal, the appellant may apply for a preliminary injunction or move for a stay of execution by filing a bond. The supersedeas bond filed by the petitioners was for the purpose of staying the execution of the default judgment pending appeal. The respondent court erred in ordering execution despite the perfected appeal and the filing of the supersedeas bond. This constituted an excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court set aside and annulled the portions of the orders dated April 13, 1950, and May 12, 1950, that directed the execution of the default judgment.