GR L 38129; (July, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38129 July 23, 1974
THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIANO V. AGCAOILI, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, and MAURO ABRERA, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Mauro Abrera, a veteran, was a grantee of disability benefits. He filed a mandamus petition to compel the Philippine Veterans Administration (PVA) to pay him and his family the full pension and allowances under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, which provides a life pension for veterans “permanently incapacitated from work.” The parties submitted a stipulation of facts. It revealed that the PVA had provisionally approved Abrera’s claim but, upon physical examination, found his injury did not permanently incapacitate him from work. Consequently, his benefits were rated under a schedule for temporary disabilities, resulting in a variable pension based on a percentage rating (e.g., 60%), not the full statutory pension. His wife and children received no allowances because the law required permanent incapacity for such benefits.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Mauro Abrera is entitled to the full pension and dependent allowances under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, despite a stipulation of facts stating his disability was not found to have permanently incapacitated him from work.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court set aside the lower court’s decision and dismissed the mandamus petition. The ruling is anchored on two primary legal points. First, the lower court erred in disregarding the binding stipulation of facts. Stipulations of fact are judicial admissions binding on the parties and require no further proof. The stipulation explicitly stated Abrera’s disability was not permanent but variable, subject to re-rating. The court must render judgment strictly in accordance with such stipulations. Since Abrera never claimed the stipulation was made through a palpable mistake, the lower court’s judgment contradicting these agreed facts was inefficacious.
Second, the plain language of the law is restrictive. Section 9 expressly grants full pensions and dependent allowances only to veterans “permanently incapacitated from work.” This qualifying phrase cannot be disregarded. Abrera, whose disability was rated as partial and temporary, does not fall within this statutory class. The Court distinguished the cited precedents (Begosa and Teoxon) as involving veterans with permanent disabilities. However, the Court clarified that for his 60% disability rating, Abrera was entitled to 60% of the increased pension under subsequent laws (e.g., P120 from a P200 base), but actual payment was subject to the availability of specifically appropriated government funds, which were lacking. Thus, while his legal entitlement was defined, no affirmative order for payment could be issued due to the absence of funds.