GR L 38094; (November, 1979) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38094 November 7, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERBERTO DIAMONON, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On the evening of November 17, 1971, the already intoxicated appellant Jerberto Diamonon and his companion, Ely Calicdan, Jr., were drinking at a furniture shop in Quezon City. The victim, Ciriaco Macasinag, joined them briefly. After leaving, Diamonon and Calicdan were overheard by witness Reynaldo Mars plotting against Macasinag, with Diamonon expressing a desire to assault him. Mars warned Macasinag, and the two left the shop to buy cigarettes, followed by the appellant and Calicdan. On the way to Macasinag’s house, Mars saw Diamonon draw a bladed weapon. Diamonon overtook Macasinag at the foot of the stairs to his residence and stabbed him. Calicdan pursued Mars, who escaped. Another witness, Juan Mateos, later saw Calicdan stabbing the prostrate victim while Diamonon stood by, armed and poised to stab. When Mateos attempted to carry the wounded Macasinag to get help, Diamonon and Calicdan blocked his path and threatened him. The victim, who sustained multiple fatal stab wounds, was later pronounced dead at the hospital.
ISSUE
The core issue for automatic review is whether the Circuit Criminal Court correctly convicted Jerberto Diamonon of Murder and imposed the death penalty.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for Murder but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The legal logic proceeds from the establishment of conspiracy and the presence of treachery. The Court found conspiracy evident from the coordinated actions of Diamonon and Calicdan: they plotted the attack, jointly followed the victim, and executed the assault together, with Calicdan continuing the attack while Diamonon stood guard. This unity of purpose and action established their criminal liability as co-conspirators.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was correctly appreciated. The attack was sudden and unexpected, executed in a manner that denied the victim any opportunity to defend himself. The victim was unarmed and unaware of the imminent danger, especially after having just socialized with his assailants. The Court rejected the claim of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, finding no conclusive proof that the appellant surrendered himself unconditionally to authorities. However, the Court considered the alternative circumstance of intoxication. While the appellant was drunk, the Court ruled it was not of such a degree as to diminish his intelligence and intent, thus it was treated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Nevertheless, with the abolition of the death penalty under the 1973 Constitution, the Supreme Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court also ordered the appellant to pay indemnity to the victim’s heirs. A separate concurring and dissenting opinion argued that the death penalty was justified, citing the presence of treachery and abuse of superior strength.