G.R. No. L-37674. January 21, 1988. LIMPAN INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE CARLOS L. SUNDIAM, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila, Branch XXVIII and JOSEPH ARCACHE, respondents.
FACTS:

Petitioner Limpan Investment Corporation filed an ejectment suit against private respondent Joseph Arcache in the City Court of Manila. The proceedings were not recorded. The City Court rendered a decision in favor of Limpan, ordering Arcache to pay rental arrears and attorney’s fees. Arcache appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI), which conducted a trial de novo and subsequently dismissed the ejectment suit. Limpan then filed a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, and Record on Appeal to elevate the CFI’s decision to the Court of Appeals.
The private respondent opposed the approval of the Record on Appeal, arguing the CFI decision was not appealable via ordinary appeal. The CFI, presided by respondent Judge Sundiam, disapproved the Record on Appeal. It ruled that the proper remedy was a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, pursuant to a 1971 CA Resolution governing appeals from CFI decisions in cases originating from inferior courts. The petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied, prompting this petition to compel approval of the Record on Appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance correctly held that the proper mode of appeal from its decision, rendered after a trial de novo of an ejectment case originally filed in an inferior court, is by petition for review and not by ordinary appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the CFI’s ruling on the procedural issue but ultimately decided the case on its merits. The Court held that the CFI was correct in disapproving the Record on Appeal. Republic Act No. 6031 , which converted inferior courts into courts of record, did not render the unrecorded proceedings in the City Court null and void. Consequently, the CFI properly conducted a trial de novo on appeal. Following the procedural law in force, specifically the Court of Appeals’ 1971 Resolution and later Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), the correct remedy from the CFI’s decision in such a case is a petition for review, not an ordinary appeal. Therefore, the respondent judge did not err in requiring a petition for review.
However, in the interest of justice and due to the case’s long pendency, the Supreme Court opted to resolve the substantive merits. Examining the records, the Court found the private respondent’s claim—that he had vacated the premises in October 1968 and thus owed no rent for November 1968 to July 1970—was belied by evidence. His furniture remained, statements of account and demand letters were sent, and the initial complaint was for ejectment, not merely collection. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the CFI decision and reinstated the City Court’s judgment in favor of the petitioner for payment of rental arrears, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.