G.R. No. L-37560 June 14, 1974
ARTURO DE SANTOS, as Administrator and Heir of the Late Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ENRIQUE AGANA, as Judge of the CFI of Rizal Province, Branch XXVIII (Pasay City Branch), and The HONORABLE PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, as Judge of the CFI of Rizal Province, Branch III (Pasay City Branch), and The Spouses MILAGROS DE SANTOS ANGELES and RICARDO ANGELES, respondents.

FACTS

Special Proceedings No. 1790-P for the settlement of the estate of Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos was originally assigned to Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, presided by Judge Pedro JL. Bautista. Petitioner Arturo de Santos, a son of the deceased, was the appointed regular administrator. Respondent Milagros de Santos Angeles, claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, filed a motion for intervention. When Judge Bautista went on sick leave, the case was endorsed to Branch XXVIII under Judge Enrique Agana. Upon Judge Bautista’s return, petitioner filed a petition before Judge Agana to transfer the case back. Judge Agana ordered its return provided Judge Bautista had no objection, but Judge Bautista declined, citing an agreement by the parties to have all pending incidents heard by Judge Agana.
Subsequently, during a pre-trial conference, Judge Agana expressed an opinion regarding the status of Milagros de Santos Angeles as an acknowledged natural child. Petitioner contended this amounted to pre-judgment and constituted a ground for disqualification. Petitioner thus filed this petition for certiorari seeking to disqualify Judge Agana and to have the case returned to Judge Bautista. Private respondents argued the expressed opinion was insufficient for disqualification. Two other heirs intervened, taking opposing sides in the dispute.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for certiorari to disqualify Judge Agana and to return the case to Judge Bautista has been rendered moot and academic.

RULING

Yes, the petition has been rendered moot and academic. The legal logic is grounded in the judicial principle that courts will not determine cases where no actual controversy exists or where the issues have become academic. During the oral argument before the Supreme Court, the petitioner, the private respondents, and one intervenor, through their respective counsels, collectively manifested that they had full faith in the impartiality of Judge Bautista and had no objection to him hearing the case. This unified manifestation fundamentally altered the procedural posture of the case, removing the core dispute over judicial assignment and disqualification.
In response to this development, the Supreme Court required Judge Bautista to comment on his willingness to accept the case. Judge Bautista formally manifested to the Court that he was “ready and willing to take back the subject Sp. Proc. No. 1790-P and to continue hearing the same.” This manifestation from the judge originally assigned, coupled with the parties’ consent, resolved the very relief sought by the petitioner—the return of the case to Judge Bautista. Consequently, the central question of disqualifying Judge Agana and transferring the case lost its practical legal significance. With no live controversy remaining for judicial resolution, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot and academic, without costs. The ruling exemplifies the Court’s adherence to resolving only actual, ongoing controversies.