G.R. No. L-37364, May 9, 1975
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., petitioner, vs. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 2, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., detained since the proclamation of martial law, was charged before Military Commission No. 2 with murder, illegal possession of firearms, and subversion. He filed a petition for prohibition, challenging the military tribunal’s jurisdiction to try a civilian for offenses allegedly committed before martial law. While the case was pending, Aquino filed a motion to withdraw his petition, seeking to remove the case from the Supreme Court’s cognizance. The Court, by a 7-3 vote, denied the withdrawal motion. The majority proceeded to resolve the merits, leading to the issuance of this decision alongside several separate concurring and dissenting opinions. A key procedural vote also addressed whether an accused could waive his presence in pre-trial proceedings, with a majority upholding a right to total waiver.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the Supreme Court should have granted Aquino’s motion to withdraw his petition. Subsidiarily, on the merits, the issue is whether a military commission has jurisdiction to try a civilian for offenses allegedly committed prior to the proclamation of martial law.

RULING

The Court, in its main per curiam decision, denied the petition and upheld the jurisdiction of Military Commission No. 2. The legal logic is anchored on the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief under a valid proclamation of martial law. The Court ruled that the President, pursuant to his military authority, possesses the power to create military tribunals and to determine the cases cognizable by them. This includes the trial of civilians for specific crimes deemed to affect public order and safety, such as subversion and illegal possession of firearms, even if allegedly committed before martial law. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the commission’s proceedings.
In a detailed dissenting opinion, Justice Teehankee, joined by Justice Muñoz Palma, argued forcefully for granting the withdrawal motion. The dissent’s legal logic is rooted in judicial restraint and the constitutional role of the courts. It posited that since the petitioner himself sought to withdraw the case and the Solicitor General had initially argued the petition was premature, judicial abstention was proper. This would allow the fundamental constitutional questions to be resolved in other pending cases presenting a more appropriate controversy. On the merits, the dissent argued that military tribunals lack jurisdiction to try civilians when civil courts are open and functioning, as this violates the constitutional supremacy of civilian authority and the Bill of Rights. It emphasized that the principle of civilian judicial process is a safeguard for all citizens, not just for the present administration. Justice Fernando, in a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, also expressed deep concern over the jurisdictional issue, highlighting the grave constitutional implications of subjecting civilians to military trial. Justice Barredo, concurring, focused on the procedural aspect, agreeing with the denial of the withdrawal motion to settle the paramount public issues involved.