G.R. No. L-37296 October 30, 1975
RUFINO TAROMA and CAYETANA GASIDAN, petitioners, vs. HON. MARCELINO N. SAYO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IV (Batac) of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and INOCENCIO CRISOSTOMO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Rufino Taroma and Cayetana Gasidan filed an action to quiet title and recover land with damages against respondent Inocencio Crisostomo in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The lower court, then presided by Judge Jose A. Madarang, set the case for pre-trial on March 2, 1971. Notice was served by registered mail only upon respondent’s counsel of record, Atty. Venancio Albano. Neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared at the pre-trial. Consequently, the court declared respondent in default, received petitioners’ evidence ex-parte, and rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners on March 13, 1972.
On April 12, 1972, respondent, through new counsel Atty. Castor Raval, filed a motion to set aside the default order and decision. He argued he was denied due process as he personally had not been notified of the pre-trial, and his former counsel disclaimed receipt of the notice. Respondent Judge Marcelino N. Sayo, who had replaced the retired Judge Madarang, granted the motion in an Order dated February 26, 1973. He set aside the default and the decision, primarily on the ground that respondent “was not duly notified of the pre-trial,” and reset the case for a new pre-trial. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting them to file this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE

Whether notice of a pre-trial conference must be served separately upon the party-litigant as well as upon his counsel of record to validly declare a party in default for non-appearance.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled affirmatively, dismissing the petition. The Court reaffirmed its recent rulings in Lim v. Animas and Pineda v. Court of Appeals that notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record. The legal logic is anchored on Rule 20, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court, which make pre-trial mandatory and authorize the court to declare a party who fails to appear as in default or non-suited. Given these severe consequences, the general rule under Rule 13, Section 2 that notice to counsel is notice to the party is deemed insufficient and inadequate for pre-trial purposes. Due process demands that the party be personally informed to ensure his right to participate in a critical stage of the proceedings aimed at simplifying issues, exploring settlement, and expediting trial.
To provide practical guidance, the Court prescribed a uniform procedure. While service of notice to the party may be made directly, trial courts should best serve such notice to the party through or care of his counsel at counsel’s address of record. The notice must expressly impose upon counsel the obligation to notify his client of the pre-trial details and to ensure the client either appears or delivers a written authority for counsel to represent him with compromise powers. The notice should be addressed to both the party and the counsel, for example: “Mr. Inocencio Crisostomo, defendant, c/o Atty. Castor Raval, Laoag City and Atty. Castor Raval, counsel for defendant, Laoag City.” This method balances due process requirements with administrative feasibility. Consequently, the respondent judge’s order setting aside the default was upheld as the initial notice served only on counsel was legally insufficient.