G.R. No. L-36527 February 29, 1988
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS for the Port of Manila, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XIII, presided over by Hon. JESUS P. MORFE and JESUS G. DE JESUS, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Jesus G. De Jesus, a tobacco importer, sought relief from the Court of First Instance of Manila via a petition for injunction, prohibition, and mandamus after customs authorities refused to release his imported tobacco. The trial court ruled in his favor on May 15, 1972. The pivotal dispute arose over when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the petitioners, received its copy of this decision. The OSG alleged receipt on May 25, 1972, and filed a Notice of Appeal on June 23, 1972. The private respondent moved for execution, arguing the appeal was late. The trial court found that the OSG was served on May 23, 1972, rendering the June 23 Notice of Appeal filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period and declaring its decision final and executory. It subsequently issued a writ of mandamus for the tobacco’s release.
The OSG elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action, contending the appeal was timely perfected, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction to execute its judgment. After examination, the appellate court, in a Decision promulgated on January 23, 1973, sustained the trial court’s factual finding that service was effected on May 23, 1972. It held the decision had become final, lifted its restraining order, and dismissed the OSG’s petition. The OSG’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual finding of the Court of Appeals regarding the date of receipt of the trial court’s decision by the Office of the Solicitor General.

RULING

The Petition is denied. The Supreme Court emphasized that a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law. The Court does not re-examine factual determinations made by the Court of Appeals, barring exceptional circumstances such as a complete absence of evidentiary support or a finding so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners’ core argument—assailing the appellate court’s factual conclusion that service was made on May 23, 1972, instead of May 25, 1972—falls squarely within the realm of factual review, which is beyond the scope of the instant petition. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that the factual finding was devoid of record support or that any of the grounds under Section 4, Rule 45 for a substantive review were present. Consequently, the Court is bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Since the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the failure to do so rendered the trial court’s decision final and executory, justifying the issuance of the writ of execution.