G.R. No. L-3648 November 29, 1951
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. IDRIS AMILHUSIN alias DATU IDIRIS, defendant and appellant.

FACTS

The accused, Idris Amilhusin alias Datu Idiris, was convicted of treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua with its accessories by the Court of First Instance of Jolo. The evidence established that around nine in the morning of November 7, 1944, the accused, armed with a revolver and kris and accompanied by four policemen (Arajain, Jimlahan, Hassan, and Nawadil) armed with barongs and spears, went to the house of Antonio de la Peña in Bakal, Lapak, Island of Siasi, Jolo, to arrest him for having helped guerrillas by repairing their rifles. After tying his hands, they took him to a forest. This was the last time Natividad de la Peña saw her husband. Maharadja Maling and his daughter Jabaira Maling, who were following behind in the same direction, saw the accused on horseback heading towards the forest with the policemen and Antonio de la Peña. Upon reaching a place between Bakal and Maulana, the accused ordered Arajain to slash Antonio de la Peña. Complying, Arajain unsheathed his kris and slashed Antonio on the neck, causing his death. The accused, upon noticing Maharadja and his daughter, warned them not to reveal what they had seen or he would kill them.
The defense presented witnesses who testified that on the morning of November 7, 1944, they saw De la Peña with a cane and Irilis with a kris walking together on a trail; that after a while, De la Peña and Irilis fought, and when the former hit Irilis with his cane, the latter defended himself with his kris, resulting in De la Peña falling dead. Additional evidence of the accused’s adherence to the Japanese forces included a letter dated May 26, 1943, which he admitted as authentic, addressed to the Naval Garrison Commander, requesting fifty firearms and ammunition to return to Siasi District to fight “trainees” (guerrillas) and expressing his loyalty to the Japanese Government. Furthermore, in September 1944, in Maulana, Siasi, Jolo, the accused administered an oath on a Koran to each of his one hundred followers, who swore to defend the Philippines with their lives and fight against the Americans; after the oath, he led them in shouting “Banzai” three times.
After the parties presented their arguments, the accused filed a motion for new trial based on an affidavit of Jubaira Maling, which essentially stated that in 1948, a certain Jamasali Usman called her and her father and induced them to testify against the accused by declaring that he had killed Antonio de la Peña; they refused, saying it was not true, and were maltreated by Usman; she was hit on the head; he threatened to accuse them of being spies for the Japanese; to avoid being accused, they agreed to testify against the accused; they lived in Usman’s house for three months, supported by him, and during that time learned how to testify; what they declared in court was taught by Usman.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused of treason and in denying his motion for a new trial based on a witness’s retraction.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for new trial and affirmed the appealed judgment. The Court found the open adherence of the accused to the ideals of the Japanese army demonstrated beyond doubt, and the aid given to them amply proven. The execution of Antonio de la Peña for having helped the guerrillas was positive aid rendered by the accused to the Japanese soldiers. The Court upheld the trial court’s assessment, which found the testimony of the prosecution witnesses “candid, positive, consistent and reasonable” and entitled to greater weight. The defense theory was deemed a material impossibility, as it was improbable that Irilis (the alleged killer per the defense) could have killed Antonio after he had already been arrested and taken away by the accused and his companions. The Court also found no reason to give credit to Jubaira Maling’s retraction, noting that obtaining affidavits of retraction is a frequently used recourse, and believing every retraction outright would lead to mass acquittals. The trial court, having observed the demeanor of the witnesses, was in the best position to judge their credibility.