G.R. No. L-36359 January 31, 1974
FELIX BUCTON AND NICANORA GABAR BUCTON, petitioners, vs. ZOSIMO GABAR, JOSEFINA LLAMOSO GABAR AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Felix and Nicanora Bucton filed an action for specific performance against respondents Zosimo and Josefina Gabar. The spouses are siblings-in-law. Petitioners sought to compel respondents to execute a deed of sale for the western half of a parcel of land. Petitioners’ evidence showed that in 1946, respondent Josefina purchased the land. A verbal agreement was made wherein petitioner Nicanora would pay half the purchase price (P1,500) and own half the land. Pursuant to this, Nicanora gave Josefina P1,000 on January 19, 1946, evidenced by a receipt stating it was “part payment” for one-half of the land. A further P400 was paid in 1948. Petitioners immediately took possession of the western half, built houses, made improvements, and enjoyed the fruits and rentals. Despite full payment and decades of possession, respondents refused to execute the formal deed, citing an existing mortgage as an excuse.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering respondents to execute the deed of conveyance. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the complaint. It held that the action, based on the 1946 written receipt, was one for specific performance arising from a written contract, which prescribes in ten years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Since the complaint was filed in 1969, more than ten years from the first payment in 1946, the action had prescribed.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners’ action to compel the execution of a deed of sale and obtain title to their portion of the land has prescribed.

RULING

No, the action has not prescribed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the action is imprescriptible. The Court clarified that the petitioners’ cause of action is not merely for specific performance of a contract to sell. The true nature of the action is to quiet title, as the sale was already consummated by the delivery of possession to the petitioners-vendees. The petitioners had fully paid their share and had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the land for over two decades, claiming ownership. Following established jurisprudence, an action to quiet title or to remove a cloud upon one’s ownership is imprescriptible when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the property. The reason is that a possessor-owner has a continuing right to seek equitable relief to ascertain and determine any adverse claim against his title. He need not act until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked. Since the petitioners were in possession, the defense of prescription is unavailable. The Court thereby reinstated the trial court’s judgment ordering the respondents to execute the necessary deed of conveyance.