G.R. No. L-3621; May 23, 1951
Domingo T. Dikit, petitioner, vs. Ramon A. Ycasiano, etc. and Consolidated Investments Building, Inc., respondents.

FACTS

The respondent Consolidated Investments Building, Inc. (plaintiff) filed an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 9708) in the Municipal Court of Manila against the petitioner Domingo T. Dikit (defendant). Upon an ex parte petition by the plaintiff, the respondent Judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the defendant, his attorneys, representatives, agents, and employees to refrain from entering or using the lobby and mezzanine of the Consolidated Investments Building. The petitioner filed this special civil action of certiorari, alleging that the respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ. The parties agree that if the action is one for forcible entry, the issuance of the injunction under Section 3, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court is within jurisdiction; but if it is for unlawful detainer, the issuance is in excess of jurisdiction and the writ must be set aside.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction—which hinges on whether the ejectment action filed by Consolidated Investments Building, Inc. against Domingo T. Dikit is one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the action is one for unlawful detainer, not forcible entry. Consequently, the respondent Judge acted in excess of the court’s jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ is therefore set aside as null and void.
The Court distinguished the two actions based on Section 1, Rule 72. Forcible entry involves deprivation of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, making the intruder’s possession illegal from the beginning. Unlawful detainer involves the unlawful withholding of possession after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under a contract, making the detainer’s possession originally legal but becoming illegal after such termination.
Applying the law to the facts alleged in the complaint, the petitioner’s possession of the leased premises was with the express consent of the owner by virtue of a contract of lease. His possession was therefore legal at its inception and became illegal only after his right to possession terminated due to his failure to pay rents, as demanded by the plaintiff. The alleged false representations used to obtain the lease did not convert the action into forcible entry, as the “strategy” or “stealth” under the rule refers to means used to take possession without the consent or knowledge of the possessor, not fraud in inducing a contract. Furthermore, the complaint alleged a previous demand to vacate, which is required in unlawful detainer under Section 2, Rule 72, but not in forcible entry.