GR L 3510; (May, 1951) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-3510 May 30, 1951
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Daniel Magnaye, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On the night of December 9, 1946, in San Andres, Bondoc, Atimonan, Quezon, the appellant Daniel Magnaye went to the combination house and store of Pedro Bele, pretending to buy cigarettes. When Bele handed him the cigarettes, Magnaye pulled Bele’s arm and stabbed him. Bele cried for help and ran into a room, but Magnaye followed and inflicted more stab wounds before fleeing. Bele’s brother, Catalino Estrada, pursued but failed to catch the assailant. Before his death on December 12, 1946, Bele identified Magnaye as his attacker to Bonifacio Garin and the Chief of Police. This identification was corroborated by eyewitnesses Aurelia Escritor (Bele’s wife) and Catalino Estrada, who recognized Magnaye due to sufficient light and prior familiarity. Graciano Laraquel testified that Magnaye invited him to accompany him to Bele’s house that night and that he witnessed Magnaye commit the stabbing.
The defense presented an alibi, claiming Magnaye was at a fiesta in Padre Burgos from December 8 to the early hours of December 10. However, a defense witness admitted Magnaye could have been absent for three hours unnoticed. The defense also presented an affidavit (Exhibit “H”) where Laraquel confessed to the killing, but Laraquel repudiated this in a subsequent affidavit (Exhibit “G”) and in court, stating he was threatened and maltreated by policemen, including Pancho Decena, into making the false confession. Defense witnesses Adriano Eroles and Honorio Abendan testified they saw Laraquel near the crime scene acting suspiciously, but their testimony was deemed incredible and contradicted by other evidence.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the appellant Daniel Magnaye is guilty of the murder of Pedro Bele, and the determination of the proper penalty considering the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. The positive identification of Magnaye by the dying victim and eyewitnesses, who knew him well, prevails over the weak alibi and the discredited affidavit of Laraquel. The Court found no mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, as Magnaye could write his name. It also found no separate aggravating circumstances of dwelling or craft. The house and store combination was not considered a dwelling in the legal sense for aggravating circumstances, and the pretended purchase was considered part of the treachery (alevosia) that qualified the killing as murder. With no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law was incorrect for a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or death. Therefore, the Court modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua. The judgment was affirmed with this modification.
