G.R. No. L-351; April 30, 1946
Hans J. Sameth, petitioner, vs. The Director of Prisons, respondent.

FACTS

On March 7, 1946, petitioner Hans J. Sameth, a Czechoslovakian (or Austrian, per respondent’s certificate) citizen, filed a petition for habeas corpus. He alleged he was unlawfully imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prisons. He was apprehended on June 12, 1945 (or June 9, 1945, per the respondent), by the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) on charges of collaboration and impersonating a U.S. Army officer. He was turned over to the Commonwealth Government on October 25, 1945, and remained detained despite the People’s Court refusing to act on his petition for provisional release, citing lack of jurisdiction. He argued no formal complaint or information had been filed against him, his detention violated Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and as a foreigner, he could not be prosecuted for treason.
The respondent Director of Prisons, in his answer, justified the detention on two primary grounds. First, petitioner had been convicted on February 17, 1944, by the Court of First Instance of Manila on three counts of estafa and committed to prison on March 18, 1944. He was serving this sentence until February 5, 1945, when he was released upon a verbal order from the Japanese detachment commander at the New Bilibid Prisons as Japanese forces retreated. The respondent contended this release was null and void and did not terminate his sentence. Second, the arrest and investigation by U.S. Army authorities for collaboration and impersonation were valid. The respondent calculated that petitioner still had an unexpired sentence of one year, one month, and six days to serve, which would be reduced by the period of his detention under the Commonwealth Government from October 25, 1945.

ISSUE

The primary legal issue is whether the petitioner’s continued detention is lawful. This hinges on the validity of the verbal pardon/order of release granted by the Japanese detachment commander on February 5, 1945, which, if valid, would have extinguished his remaining sentence for estafa.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus. The Court held:
1. The judgment of conviction for estafa rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila during the Japanese occupation was legal and valid, as it was pronounced by a competent court of a de facto government (citing Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon).
2. The verbal order of release/pardon issued by the Japanese detachment commander on February 5, 1945, was null and void and of no legal effect. The Court took judicial notice that by February 5, 1945, Japanese forces had lost effective control over Manila and Rizal as they retreated, pursued by U.S. and guerrilla forces. Consequently, the authority of the enemy occupation forces had ceased. Any order issued under those circumstances, especially by a low-ranking detachment commander and not by the head of the Philippine Republic or the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, was invalid.
3. Therefore, the petitioner must serve the unexpired portion of his valid estafa sentence. He is entitled to credit for the period of his detention under the Commonwealth Government from October 25, 1945. The arrest and initial detention by U.S. Army authorities were also held to be unquestionably legal.
Separate Opinions:
* Justice Briones (Concurring): Agreed with the dismissal, arguing that the petitioner’s total period of detention, whether under U.S. Army or Commonwealth authority, more than covered his sentence.
* Justice Feria (Concurring and Dissenting): Concurred in the result based on the validity of the estafa conviction but suggested that if the petitioner were detained solely for collaboration (for which he could not be tried for treason as a foreigner), he should be deported or prosecuted for other applicable offenses.
* Justice Perfecto (Dissenting): Voted for the petitioner’s immediate release. He argued that, consistent with either the majority or minority view in the Co Kim Cham case, the petitioner should be freed. If the occupation courts’ acts were void, his conviction was void. If they were valid, then the Japanese commander’s pardon must also be recognized as valid. He emphasized the need for consistency in the Court’s rulings.