GR L 34971; (May, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-34971 May 31, 1974
SOCORRO G. DE CASTRO, Represented by her Attorney-in-Fact RAFAEL G. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. DELTA MOTOR SALES CORP. and The HONORABLE Judge AQUILINO P. BONTO, District Judge, Branch II, Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Socorro G. de Castro filed a civil action in Sorsogon against respondent Delta Motor Sales Corporation for damages. Delta Motor filed a motion to dismiss, but its initial motion was defective as it lacked a proper notice of hearing, merely directing the clerk to submit it for consideration “immediately upon receipt.” The trial court denied this motion for being defective. Delta Motor then refiled its motion to dismiss with a proper notice of hearing. De Castro opposed this motion and moved to declare Delta Motor in default for allegedly failing to file a timely answer.
The trial court, presided by respondent Judge Aquilino P. Bonto, issued an order denying the motion to declare Delta Motor in default. The court reasoned that by allowing Delta Motor to refile its motion, it had effectively extended the period for filing an answer. It cited judicial policy favoring a flexible attitude towards defendants in procedural matters and deferred resolution on the motion to dismiss, finding the grounds not indubitable. De Castro’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to declare Delta Motor in default and in allowing it to file an answer.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy strictly for correcting errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Its office is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and to correct acts performed without or in excess of jurisdiction, including instances of grave abuse of discretion equivalent to a refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
The respondent judge’s discretionary act of not declaring Delta Motor in default and allowing it to file an answer after deferring action on its motion to dismiss did not constitute a capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of judgment. The Court noted that trial courts possess discretion in procedural matters to serve the ends of justice, such as permitting the filing of an answer beyond the reglementary period under just terms as provided by the Rules. Any perceived error in the interlocutory order is an error of judgment, correctible by appeal from the final judgment, not by certiorari. To allow certiorari for every interlocutory order would lead to interminable delays and clog court dockets. The petition, raising no genuine jurisdictional issue, was an improper substitute for an appeal.
